RIPPLE SALVO… #82… The May 1966 DPM… but first…
20 MAY 1966…(NYT)…ON THE HOME FRONT… A cloudy Friday in New York City…
Page 1: “White House Bars Draft Of Youth For Civilian Duty”…Secretary McNamara’s speech on 18 May suggesting that all American youth should serve two years as volunteers in the service of their country, if not in the military, then in the Peace Corps, or a Youth Corps to assist in the communities, lit off a reaction from both the White House and the Congress. White House aides acted quickly to dispel any idea that McNamara had said anything new or different from the Administration in his speech. Many in Congress took the opportunity to demand a change in the Selective Service policies with the result that two resolutions were passed to “restudy the draft system.”…
Page 1: … and side by side with the U.S. draft article: “Soviet To Intensify Military Training Of Its Civilians”… Soviet leadership stated that “strengthening the military defense capability of the nation, increasing the vigilance of all Soviet people and training them in constant readiness to defend the country” was a national priority. Leonid Brezhnev, speaking in Vladivostok, said: “… a high level of defense preparation and unflagging military vigilance are most essential in the present international situation…”Can we forget even for a minute that the Pentagon’s air pirates, murderers and arsonists carry out criminal raids daily on towns and villages of a fraternal socialist country, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam?”… He reiterated that the Soviet Union was giving “concrete military aid to North Vietnam.” He concluded: “Let the American imperialists understand that in widening their aggression in Vietnam they will collide with the most tangible demonstration of the combat solidarity of the socialist countries, of the solidarity of revolutionaries.”
Page 1: “Ky Troops Use Tanks In Danang Against Rebels”… The Buddhist leaders were driven into their pagoda compound in Danang along with a unit of dissident Buddhist ARVN troops to set up a standoff. U.S. efforts to get Thi to meet with Premier Ky failed when the Buddhist leader refused to attend…. Page !: “April Indexes Show Slowdown In Economic Boom,” but increase in Vietnam War spending could spur pressures for a rise in inflation… Housing starts and manufacturing were down significantly… Page 1:…small box filler reports that Israelis will be getting “older model” A-4 Skyhawks, that are “the mainstay of the carrier striking force in Vietnam.”…
Page 4: “Ratio Of Allied To Enemy Battlefield Deaths at 6:1,” which is the highest kill ratio in nine months. “In the week ended May 14, 86 Americans were killed, 566wounded and 3 were missing in action. South Vietnam forces: 72 KIA, 229 WIA, and 19 MIA (or deserted). Enemy losses: 998 KIA and 192 captured…and in a little box accompanying, the Department of Defense announced the death of 45 American troops Killed in Combat,” two from NYC… Lest we forget, more than 58,000 warriors bled out in Vietnam.
20 MAY 1966… ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS… (From the NYT 21 May reporting 20 May activity) … “For the sixth consecutive day monsoonal rains and wind limited U.S. fighter-bomber attacks on North Vietnam. The Air Force failed to send a single mission and Navy aircraft from carriers mounted only 12 missions against barges and junks and other coastal targets… There were no fixed wing aircraft losses in Southeast Asia on this date… and very little flying …. “…shut up and deal…”
RIPPLE SALVO… #82…The DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM OF MAY 1966… The DPM…
May of 1966 was a good time to take stock of the Rolling Thunder Operation. Secretary of Defense McNamara chose a “Draft Presidentail Memorandum” as his instrument for brainstorming his brain trust. The product of that Delphi method of achieving a consensus began with an extensive memorandum drafted by staffer John McNaughton. Therefore, this is a good place to present to you serious students of the Vietnam War and readers of RTR, the same question and situation upon which to make your case for “where do we go from here?”…
“The question before the house…”…”whether to continue the program of attacks in the Hanoi-Haiphong area or for an indefinite period to concentrate all attacks on communication in the lower half of North Vietnam (south of 20 degrees)…” Attacking the ports and mining the harbors was excluded from consideration as being too risky with respect to drawing the Soviets or PRC into the fight. Also, the marching orders pointed out that there were few important targets left in the Red River Valley and that the conduct of armed reconnaissance in Red River Valley and the North above 20 degrees had “proven very costly, risky and unprofitable.” McNaughton….. (Source: Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume IV)
“We have the alternative open to us of continuing to conduct attacks between 20-23 degrees North— that is, striking minor fixed targets (like battery, fertilizer, and rubber plants and barracks) while conducting armed reconnaissance against movement on roads, railroads and waterways. This course, however, is costly in American lives and involves serious dangers of escalation. The loss rate in Hanoi-Haiphong Route Package 6 (the northeast quadrant), for example is more than 6 times the loss rate in the southern most Route Packages 1 and 2; and actions in the Hanoi-Haiphong area involve serious risks of generating confrontations with the Soviet Union and China, both because they involve destruction of MIGs on the ground and encounters with the MIGs in the air and because they may be construed as a US intention to crush the Hanoi regime.
“The military gain from destruction of additional military targets north of 20-degrees will be slight. If we believed that air attacks in that area would change Hanoi’s will, they might be worth the added loss of American life and the risks of expansion of the war. However, there is no evidence that will be the case, while there is considerable evidence that such bombing will strengthen Hanoi’s will. In this connection, Consul-General Rice in Hong Kong…said what we believe to be the case— that we cannot by bombing reach the critical level of pain in North Vietnam and that, “below that level, pain only increases the will to fight.” Sir Robert Thompson, who was a key officer in the British success in Malaya, said…that our bombing, particularly in the Red River basin, “is unifying North Vietnam.”
McNaughton’s proposed DPM for the participation of the OSD Whiz Kids to consider and reject, agree or improve included these factors for inclusion in their deliberations: (1) The bombing of the North had little or nothing to do with the morale of SVN and US troops..(2) General Westmoreland supported bombing but wanted the bombing concentrated in the “extended battle zone” just north of the DMZ…(3) there was support for a campaign that concentrated the bulk of the bombing effort in the lower half of NVN, but allowed strikes in the upper half as desired… all of which led to McNaughton’s stalking horse edition of the DPM conclusion;
“We therefor recommend that all of the sorties allowed in the ROLLING THUNDER program be concentrated on the lines of communication–the ‘funnel’ through which men and supplies to the south must flow–between 17-20 degrees reserving the option and intention to strike in the 20-30 degree area as necessary to keep the enemy’s investment in defense and in repair crews high throughout the country.”
As you can imagine, the marching orders set off a week of intense brainstorming as all the Secretary’s men massaged the straw man and sought to get their respective inputs accepted for inclusion in the final DPM. The “bunch of guys sitting around the table” (BOGSAT) were under pressure to come up with a new game plan for ROLLING THUNDER in the summer/fall of 1966…
If you were a participant and a voice to be heard, another guy sitting at the table, what would you have advised McNamara?…
Watch these spaces for exciting developments… or, maybe not…
Lest we forget… Bear ………. –30– ………..