RIPPLE SALVO…#81…”‘STRAIGHT DOWN”… but first…
Good Morning: Day EIGHTY-ONE of a long look back to the “air war” with North Vietnam…
19 MAY 1966 (NYT)…ON THE HOME FRONT… A rainy Thursday in New York…
Page 1: “McNamara Urges Two-Year Service for All U.S. Youth”…The Secretary of Defense used a speaking opportunity to state his position on the dispute of the month– inequities in the nation’s Selective Service system. He addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors annual muster in Montreal and suggested that the Peace Corps and Anti-Poverty programs be added as alternatives to the military draft. He complimented the youth of America as being a community of committed and dedicated citizens as demonstrated by the success of the Peace Corps. “It (the youth) has proved that in its enormously successful performance in the Peace Corps overseas, and its willingness to volunteer for a final assault on poverty and lack of opportunity that still remain in our country.” McNamara contends that his plan will remove the acknowledged inequities of the current system. He pointed out that a draft call of 150,000 only yields 25-30,000 eligible for service in the military. An equal number enlist but others fail physical exams and are deferred. A program to rehabilitate these individuals during war time is not feasible. The Secretary also briefly discussed relations with Red China and the Soviet Union stating that isolation is not an option for the United States but that no nation can by itself keep the peace in the world, and that the United States does not want that role….Page 1: “Renewed Fighting In Danang”… with small and widely distributed gun battles between loyal ARVN troops and anti-government forces, including Buddhists, guerrillas, Vietcong, and the “struggle group” of dissident youths. …
Page 2: “Vietnamese Kill 600 Vietcong In The Mekong Delta In Week”… four battles in a week of killing highlighted by a fight between 1000 ARVN troops and a battalion of hard core Vietcong that left 262 Vietcong bodies on the battlefield 102 miles southwest of Saigon. Sixty-one North Vietnamese were killed by American GIs of the 1st Cavalry in the central highlands in another battle. Page 3: “U.S. In New Bid To Help Vietnam War Prisoners”…”The United States has begun to give more emphasis to its desire to obtain good treatment and, if possible, the release of United States prisoners held by the Vietcong and in North Vietnam. The State Department announced today that W. Averill Harriman, Ambassador at Large, had been given general responsibility for efforts on behalf of these prisoners. Meetings with the International Red Cross in Geneva are the beginning of the quest to return our imprisoned men.”…
PRESIDENT’S DAILY BRIEF (CIA)…19 MAY 1966…(TS sanitized)…”SVN: Danang was reported to be quiet tonight after the clash there earlier in the day. Ky says no plan to move against Hue (Thi). Thi says for as long as Ky stays in power ‘there will be turmoil, and any meeting in Hue will be on his (Thi) terms.'”
19 MAY 1966…ROLLING THUNDER OPS… (NYT 20 May) Yesterday United States Navy and Air Force planes mounted only 23 missions and limited their attacks to coastal targets for the fifth straight day… One aircraft loss on the day…USS Kitty Hawk lost an A-1J from VA-115 when the aircraft engine failed on the cat shot and the aircraft went into the water. The pilot was recovered by helicopter. USS Hancock and VA-215 incurred a similar loss on 14 May, less than a week before…Validating the Navy Water Survival program and Dilbert Dunker training…
RIPPLE SALVO…#81… DIVE OR GLIDE BOMBING… One of the great aviation writers of our time is England’s Peter C. Smith, who has authored at least 54 books and has been a full time historian for decades. Included in his shelves of books are several that make the case for attack aircraft in the close air support role as dive bombers. And inevitably he takes on the United States Air Force for not giving the mission a high enough priority. He makes the case eloquently in his book, “Straight Down,” applauding the attack version of the P-51 that was introduced to the operational forces as “The North American Dive-bomber” and designated the A-36. Smith attributes the introduction of the aircraft to the Air Corps inventory in 1941 to General George Marshall, who concluded that the United States needed a Junkers J-87 “Stuka” look alike dive bomber. General Marshall was impressed with the Stuka’s performance in the German blitzkreig victories of 1939 and 1940 in Europe. “I want some of those.” But the Marshall plan for fixing an Air Corps deficiency came too late and the lack of effective support for ground troops in North Africa led Assistant Secretary of the Air Force John McCloy to tour the battle front in 1942. He came home to report: “It is my firm belief that the air forces are not interested in this type of work, think it is unsound, and are very much concerned lest it result in control of air units by ground forces. Their interest, enthusiasm and energy is directed to different fields.”
Smith studied the African campaign and concluded: “At this date the only aircraft organic to an air support command were observation aircraft…But after the Tunisian campaign at the end of 1942, (and before any dive bombers could be employed) it was very apparent that the XII Air Support Command was ill equipped to demonstrate the effectiveness of any tactical air doctrine. Its pilots by and large were inexperienced and no break-in period could be afforded. Proper employment of its light bombers and fighters was being worked day by day. The troops on the front lines had good seats to compare the effectiveness of German Stukas and Air Corps air support and they too drew some conclusions: “Ground commanders were not impressed by dogmatic statements of Air Force staff officers on the ineffectiveness of close air support. They felt sure that close support could be highly effective. They felt sure because they saw the effect of German air attacks upon themselves.”
“Straight Down” is the story of the A-36 and Smith uses the tale to make the point that the A-36 never got a fair chance to prove itself. He writes: “There were no replacement A-36As. As long ago as 22 March 1943, before the a-36s had flown their first mission, the United States Army Air Force had decided to ‘kill off’ the dive bomber,’ which they never really wanted and were never happy with anyway. A Board of Officers had been convened to study the Air Force’s needs and requirements. This was to ‘Evaluate current dive-bombers now in production.’ The board recommended that the Material Command cease the procurement of Dive bombardment types ‘as soon as possible.’ A press release on 12 July 1943 followed: “The Army has concluded that it will have little need for additional dive-bombers, for the reason that dive-bombers cannot be operated unless there is clear air superiority, and then only when the ground forces are not adequately equipped with anti-aircraft equipment.” Smith calls this “an example of willful blindness from Washington.” Thus the Air Force for World War II was without a dive bomber and spent very little time training fighter pilots in the fine art of dive or glide bombing, choosing instead to employ high speed, low level, level bombing by the medium bombers to fulfill the tactical bombing mission. However, when the P-51 took over th bomber escort role from the short legged the P-47 Thunderbolt, the P-47 in the attack role became an essential performer in the drive across Europe starting on D-Day, 6 June 1944.
I had the pleasure of knowing and spending a few afternoons with Captain Abner Rainbow, a Thunderbolt pilot who dropped his first practice bombs off of his P-47 a few days before D-Day. In stateside training bombing was not on a fighter pilot’s agenda. But come D-day and subsequent assignment to the 9th Air Force that supported LGEN George Patton’s Third Army, Captain Rainbow and the three squadrons of P (for Pursuit)-47s in his wing became dive, or at least glide bombers, strafe-ers, and rocketeers in short order. They became ground attack and close air support experts. In fact, after Ab Rainbow flew his 100+ CAS and ground attack missions crossing France and some of Germany, he finished the war as a Forward Air Controller riding a tank with the Infantry. Ab Rainbow was among those valiant men who turned back the Germans at the Battle of the Bulge. After the weather cleared on Christmas Day, 1944 Captain Rainbow was airborne to lead three successive 12 P-47 strikes on German tanks and vehicles in the vicinity of St. Vith. His flights got credit for the destruction of more than 100 vehicles on that Christmas day. Abner Rainbow earned his DFC that day. While doing some research at the George Marshall Archives at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia, I came across a letter from General Ike’s Chief of Staff “Beetle” Smith to the four star back home who was the Army’s chief trainer, in which General Smith wrote that without the P-47s there would have been no Allied victory at “the bulge.” At last, the Air Force under Pete Quesada had a potent Tactical Air Force. Just in time for the beginning of the Cold War.
This was a two decade long era of Mutual Assured Destruction and the emphasis was on deterring nuclear war by being prepared to out nuke the Soviets. This required not just our strategic assets– big bombers, nuc subs, and silos full of ICBMs– but a second strike capability that included the tactical air assets of the Air Force and Navy. Nuclear weapons delivery was the top readiness and training priority ahead of conventional weapons training. In addition, aircraft were multi-mission, which means that in order to accommodate one set of missions a reduction in the maintenance and training for the second set of missions is required. In other words, Close Air Support and ground attack became a secondary mission, or worse. For the Korean War the requirement for CAS and ground attack was met primarily by the high performance prop driven fighters still operational from WWII– the P-51, F-4U and the AD-1s.
Then came the Vietnam War and Rolling Thunder. Both the Navy and the Air Force entered the fray with tactical air forces equipped with multi-mission aircraft and air crews who were either expert in nuclear weapons delivery or in air combat, but somewhat behind the learning curve in conventional weapons delivery, a deficiency remedied by necessity, just as Abner Rainbow and the P-47 pilots of 1944 were required to do. However, in the process, our losses of aircraft and aviators in the new era of integrated air defenses combining thousands of anti-aircraft guns controlled by radar, jet fighters, and surface-to-air missiles, was a painful experience for both the Navy and Air Force. The details on how each aircraft was lost in Rolling Thunder and throughout Southeast Asia in the mid to late 1960s make it clear that we came to the fight in imperfect readiness, from both equipment and training aspects. The Marines were ready and did much better in the early rounds of what would become a long war of attrition and battle of wills.
Bitter lessons are in the books for the consideration of the requirements gurus who are responsible for fielding future weapons systems that will prove effective on the inevitable battlefields that are in our future. The ongoing effort to keep the A-10 Warthog operational is indicative of the continuing requirement for aircraft and weapons to support troops in contact with the enemy. Tactical air support and the precise delivery of lethal weapons is, and always will be, the difference in winning and losing, just as it was at the Battle of the Bulge and the A Shau Valley. As General Curt Lemay said, “If you control the air, you control the land under that air.” But, I add, only if you equip and train to use that advantage. And that means planes, pilots and weapons that are specifically designed, trained and ready to survive and thrive on battlefields like St. Vith and the A Shau Valley. Advocates for eliminating manned aviation from the battlefield are writing prescriptions for defeat and are ignoring the lessons of history in their enthusiasm to embrace technology as an alternative for the air support of troops in contact with the enemy. Long live the dive and glide bombers. Comment? Have at it…
An old friend and coach, of sorts, Chuck Myers, passed away this month and with him the longest running argument for “Mud Fighters,” piloted by brave men of fighting spirit. Fearless and faithful. Skilled and cunning. Bold and bright. As was Chuck. He rests in peace… or maybe not– somewhere the case for “Mud Fighters” goes on…
Lest we forget… Bear ………. –30– ……….