RIPPLE SALVO…#131… HONOLULU, JULY 1966…
Good Morning: Day ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE of a long look back to the air war that was… OPERTION ROLLING THUNDER…
9 JULY 1966…ON THE HOME FRONT… NYT… A sunny, hot and humid Saturday in NYC…
First a note from your Humble Host: As you absorb these bits of history from Fifty Years Ago TODAY, consider the remarkable coincidence with what is going on in our country now with what was happening then… Last night in Dallas a black power advocate slew four law enforcement officers and wounded many more… in July 1966 our country was dealing with the first vestiges of Stokely Carmichael’s “black power.”
Now, Page 1 of the NYT on 9 July 1966 and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: “Dr. King Declares Rights Movement Is close To Split”… “The Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., said today that the civil rights movement was ‘very close’ to a permanent split over the black power issue and that civil rights leaders should meet immediately to patch up their differences. He said he was also considering a wave of civil disobedience demonstrations in an attempt to pry concessions from Northern cities and provide a ‘militantly non-violent alternative’ to the Black Power movement. In a series of interviews that began yesterday and continued today the Nobel prize-winning civil rights leader was critical of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee and the Congress of Racial Equality for calling for black power and for defensive violence among Negroes. ‘I get the impression that the NAACP wouldn’t mind a split because they think they are the only civil rights organization. But a split wouldn’t help any of us and we’re very, very slose to one,’ said Dr. King.”…. Page 1: “2 of 6 Klansmen Convicted of Plot To Harm Negroes”… “Two Klu Klux Klansmen previously acquitted of the murder of Lemuel Penn, a prominent Negro educator, have been found guilty under a Federal civil rights conspiracy statute.”…. Page 1: “Strike Against 5 Airlines Ties Up Travel and Mail”… and talks will resume today…”A strike against five major air lines by the International Association of Machinists disrupted most of the nation’s air travel today. No break appeared likely, at least until negotiators meet again tomorrow. Federal agencies ordered by the President to help alleviate the strikes impact found there was little they could do.”…
Page 1: “Saigon Aide Talks Of Invading The North”…”The South Vietnam Chief of State said today that North Vietnam should be invaded with ground troops if necessary to end the war. Diplomatic observers did not consider the statement by LGEN Nguyen Van Thieu, the Chief of State, a serious indication of intention. But it showed the difference in the attitudes toward the war voiced in the United States and South Vietnamese officials. It also showed the growing confidence of the government generals, which did not all American officials fined wholly welcome. General Thieu praised the recent United States raids on the fuel depots at Hanoi and Haiphong but called for even more air action. Thieu said in a speech, ‘Our country has been invaded by Communist North Vietnam. Therefore, we must destroy and demolish all military, economic and manufacturing zones, without distinction, throughout the North, the headquarters of our invaders. This should include the movement of troops into Vietnam–if it is necessary to end the war.” The United States has said repeatedly it does not seek the destruction of the Communist regime’ in North Vietnam or any territorial acquisition.”
Page 4: ‘Chinese Issue Figures”… “The official press agency for Communist China said in a Hanoi dispatch today that 10 American aircraft were shot down yesterday and three today…U.S. spokesman acknowledged the loss of two today… Another press release said that the People’s Militia held meetings all over China to condemn the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings and ‘were fully prepared to go into action against the United States’…”
9 July 1966…the President’s Daily Brief: CIA (TS sanitized) and mostly remains redacted with exception of…Vietnam:…”On balance it would appear that some Catholics probably are distrustful of Ky and his crew, but most genuinely want to see the elections successfully held in September.”
9 JULY 1966…ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS… NYT (10 July reporting 9 July ops)…Page 4: “In North Vietnam yesterday American pilots continued to hammer petroleum supply points, strategic highway, railroads and bridges, and shipping. Bombers hit three fuel dumps and a plant in an arc running from northeast to northwest of Hanoi. Navy pilots attacked fuel drums and a highway bridge 43 miles southeast of Vinh. They hit another bridge 43 miles southeast of the city and a ferry crossing two miles to the south of Bien thuy. In another attack six Navy planes dove on petroleum stores a mile and a half south of Thanh Hoa and the anti-aircraft batteries assigned to protect them. The pilots, who used 1000-pound bombs, said that they left the two main fuel tanks burning and that a large explosion had engulfed several tank trucks. According to authorities all the fuel dumps hit yesterday had been hit on earlier raids. An F-105D burst into flames while flying through heavy anti-aircraft fire to strike a storage area 35 miles north of Hanoi. The pilot and navigator were listed as MIA.” …. “Vietnam: Air Losses”…reported no fixed wing losses on 9 July 1966….oohrah…
RIPPLE SALVO… #131… “The Honolulu Conference, 8-9 July 1966″… the following is pulled directly from pages 294-297 of Jacob Van Staaveren’s superb book, “Gradual Failure: The Air War Over North-Vietnam 1965-66.” This is both a summary of howgozthe war and a sketch of where McNamara and the military leaders in the theater wanted to take the Rolling Thunder campaign for the rest of 1966. This was a very thorough “mid-year review.”
“With the POL strikes in full swing, Secretary McNamara and his aides flew to Honolulu where, on July 8, they conferred with Admiral Sharp and other Southeast Asia commanders. The purpose of the conference was to review the POL campaign, the pace of enemy infiltration into the south, future air,ground and sea deployment to the war theater, and the progress of the war. After initial briefings by Sharp and his staff, McNamara said it was now President Johnson’s desire that the services give ‘first priority’ to complete the ‘strangulation’ of the North’s POL system. He went on to say that Admiral sharp should not feel constrained by sortie limitations to accomplish this goal, which should be preceded by a thorough study of the North’s land and sea POL system, the categorization of the targets, then their destruction. Concurrently and contributory, the services should step up air strikes on the main rail lines and selected bridges. He asked the PACOM commander to submit a POL strangulation plan in accordance with these guidelines.
“Current intelligence on the eve of the conference was sobering. Despite an estimated 137,000 killed from 1959 to mid-1966, mostly in South Vietnam, North Vietnam appeared as determined and resilient as ever. Its strength in South Vietnam was believed total between 260,000 and 280,000. This contrasted with about 165,000 men a year earlier, and Viet Cong recruitment inside the south and infiltration from the north was unremitting. Further, the Hanoi regime was adjudged capable of training 75,000 to 100,000 troops annually to serve as combat replacements in the south and of fielding upwards of 500,000 troops without serious strain. Air Force and Navy bombing operations, which totaled about 3,000 combat sorties in December 1965, reached a monthly high of 7,500 in June 1966. In Laos, a yearly high of 3,000 combat sorties, including those of the Laotian Air Force, in December 1965 was eclipsed by monthly combat sorties of 6,000 to 8,000 during the driest months in the first half of 1966.
“In his briefing for McNamara, Sharp emphasized the burden of bombing restraints and requested permission to strike thirty-three significant North Vietnamese port and logistic sites used by the Soviets and Chinese for funneling supplies and enemy forces to the south and other air attacks to reduce the southward movement of supplies and troops. He observed that about 28,000 North Vietnamese had entered South Vietnam in the first five months of 1966, and the infiltration rate of 4,500 per month at the beginning of the year threatened to reach 6,900 per month by the end of December. The VC-NVA were fielding more maneuver battalions, occasionally employed division-size forces, had increased their supply stockpile, and had strengthened their support organizations.
“Despite the many restrictions on Rolling Thunder, Sharp did not consider the program a failure. This was evident, he thought, by the rapidity with which the Hanoi regime built up its anti-aircraft defenses. From March 1965, when Rolling Thunder operations began, Hanoi’s anti-aircraft gun inventory had risen from about 849 to 4,200, or an average of about 205 guns per month. In addition, there were now about 20 to 25 SA-2 SAM firing battalions, a respectable MiG force, and a good early warning and GCI systems. Bombing had forced the north to divert upwards of 500,000 military and civilian personnel to it air defenses and repair and construction units stationed along roads, trails and rail lines. In addition, more than 2,000 watercraft had been destroyed by mid-1966. The PACOM commander did not expect air power to cut off sufficient supplies to ‘isolate the battlefield’ but said he was convinced that air attacks against more significant targets would eventually undermine Hanoi’s strengths.
“Concerning future American deployments to Southeast Asia, Sharp proposed a force of about 524,800 personnel U.S. and allied personnel (50,000 Air Force) in South Vietnam and 147,800 personnel (20,000 Air Force) in Thailand and other PACOM areas by the end of 1966. For 1967, he proposed sending 121,000 more United States and allied personnel (18,300 Air Force) to South Vietnam and other PACOM areas. As future strategy promised to remain more ground than air oriented, Sharp proposed assembling a 136,800-man contingency corps for Southeast Asia for direct and indirect support of the war effort. This would raise U.S. and allied commitment to the war to 930,000 personnel (90,300 Air Force). Air combat sorties for North and South Vietnam would be increased to support the expanded military effort.
“Responding to the briefing by Sharp and others, McNamara said it was now President Johnson’s desire that the services give ‘first priority’ to complete the strangulation of the north’s POL system. Accordingly, he wanted the PACOM commander to submit a POL strangulation plan. Second priority should be given to striking a few new bridge and rail line segments within sanctuary area Hanoi and Haiphong. He quashed any service expectations that he would approve major change in other bombing restrictions within the buffer zone next to China and stressed the administration’s ‘extreme sensitivity’ to any further violations of China’s air space, as occurred on May 12 and June 29.
“The day following the end of the Honolulu conference, the JCS sent a new Rolling Thunder 51 to Admiral Sharp…”…. details tomorrow…
Pray for our country… And let’s talk… “United we stand, divided we fall.”…. God’s will, will be done…
Lest we forget… Bear ………. –30– ……….