ROLLING THUNDER REMEMBERED 4 DECEMBER 1966

RIPPLE SALVO… #277… ROLLING THUNDER 1-15 DECEMBER 1966 and THE MARIGOLD FIASCO… but first…

Good Morning: Day TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVEN of a review of Mr. McNamara’s War…

4 December 1966… HOME TOWN HEAD LINES from the New York Times on a sunny Sunday in New York…

Page 1: “President Urges U.S. Mexican Ties as Latin Model. Johnson and Diaz Ordaz see Armistad Dam being built across the Rio Grande, both hail cooperation. American says multi-nation programs point the way to hemisphere advances. While on a neighborly four hour visit to Mexico and LBJ urged the nations of Latin America to seek regional cooperation. LBJ walked from the frontier town of Del Ric to the center of the bridge where he was greeted by President Gustvo Diaz Ordaz and then on to Cuidad Acuba to celebrate the joint construction of a dam across the Rio Grande (5 column page 1 pix of open arms meeting of two Presidents and first ladies).”… Page 1 “Vietcong Attack Saigon’s Airport and a U.S Billet as shell fire and blast hit unit’s quarters. The shelling of the airport and base at Tan Son Nhut with mortars and a bomb injured seven Americans. The guerrillas broke through a minefield and fencing to fire their weapons. Sixteen Vietcong were killed in the ensuing firefight.”… Page 1: “Congress Facing Fight on U.S. Aid with a maze of domestic grant programs targets for right and left. ‘An enormous and intense struggle over Federal aid and its administration is expected in the 90th Congress that opens next month. This will be a two year pre-occupation and have an impact on the 1968 Presidential election. Federal grants in aid are under attack from all sides.’ “… Page 8: “Anti-Jordan Plot Alleged By King Hussein and he charged that the objective of the Palestinian Liberation Organization is the destruction of Jordan. The 31-year old King also said the infiltration of agitators from Syria are part of a left-wing plot against Jordan.” … Page 9: “Dick Gregory Going To Hanoi to arrange shows for G.I. captives. Purpose of trip is to both entertain POWs and to demonstrate his opposition to man’s inhumane treatment to man. Among his quotes: ‘I don’t understand how you can kill men all year and then stop just because it is Christmas. It would seem to me to be better to make every day Christmas and stop killing altogether.’…” …Page 1: “Party Corruption Conceded In Saigon…opportunities for graft and corruption abound at every level of South Vietnamese army, civil service and pacification.”…

4 DECEMBER 1966… OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… NYT (5 December reporting 4 Dec ops)…Page 3: “Rail Targets Blasted In U.S. Air Raids on North”…”United States fighter-bombers braving heavy anti-aircraft fire returned yesterday to bomb targets within six miles of Hanoi. The raids followed by a day a series of attacks in which bombers cut a key rail line in five places. No American aircraft were reported lost in the latest raid close to Hanoi. On Friday during the last bombing of Hanoi outskirts eight American aircraft were shot down–a record one day loss since the United States bombing began in August 1964. Targets yesterday were the Yenvien railway yard six miles northwest of Hanoi and the Hagis fuel storage dump 14 miles northwest of the capital. Navy pilots reported having destroyed or damaged 26 barges along the coast between Haiphong and Than Hoa, about 90-miles to the northwest.” … “Vietnam: Air Losses” (Hobson) There were no fixed wing aircraft loost in Southeast Asia on 4 December 1966…   oohrah…

RIPPLE SALVO… #277… The following provides both a brief summary of where Rolling Thunder 52 “went and did” during the first two weeks of December 1966 and some pertinent words concerning MARIGOLD that need to be a part of this journal. I quote from Edward Drea’s “McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969,” pages 80-81. This source is the official history ot the Office of Secretary of Defense for the period 1965-1968…. (Quote)…

Marigold, an initiative underway for some months to seek megotiation with Hanoi, involved the Ploish representative to the International Control Commission in Vietnam, and Lodge, with the Italian ambassador in Vietnam serving as intermediary. As the talks continued, the State Department sent word to Hanoi that Washington would suspend the bombing if North Vietnam reciprocated with mutual forms of deescalation. Meantime, the JCS and the field forces prepared for Rolling Thunder 52, still uncertain of its content, timing, and duration.

McNamara worked to convince the president of the futility of increased bombing, arguing that the North Vietnamese had adapted their transportation system to life under bombs. As long as North Vietnam could draw on its allies to make good its losses, the interdiction effort served no significant purpose. McNamara now touted the barrier system aas holding greater promise, even though untested and unproved. With these competing and contrdictory diplomatic and military initiatives simultaneously in motion, on 21 November State proposed to spread out any strikes as much as possible to cushion their effects on Marigold talks. The White House, preferring to complete Rolling Thunder quickly (except for the deferred targets) to minimize the effects on (British Foreign Minister Harold) Brown’s trip tp Moscow, leaned toward a single masssive attack as soon as the weather permitted while insisting the strikes represented no major departure in policy.

The separate diplomatic and military tracks converged on 1-2 December (1966), predictably at cross-purposes: the first day, the Poles reported the North Vietnamese had agreed to start secret discussions in Warsaw: on the second, weather over North Vietnam broke, allowing over 200 aircraft to bomb targets, most in the Hanoi environs. In some of the fiercest battles of the air war, eight planes were lost to intense SAM and AAA fire; the North Vietnamese had used the respite from bombing the Hanoi area to reconstitute and improve their air defense network. Attacks against Haiphong POL storage facilities continued through 5 December.

Following these air strikes, on 6 and 9 December the president met with OSD, JCS, and White House advsiors to consider the effects of the bombing on possible negotiations. On 9 December Johnson refused to decide on new targets “because of certain political problems,” evidently a reference to Marigold, but said he would reconsider in about a week. Then fearing the North would interpret further delay as a sign of weakness, he rejected strong appeals from McNamara, Under Secretary of State Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Lodge and Llewellyn Thompson to cancel additional attacks; instead, he declined to halt air strikes against two targets near Hanoi on 13 December and heavier follow-on raids the next day. Two days of concentrated attacks cost four more warplanes, including two downed during the 14 December restrike of the Yen Vien railway yard.

These raids touched off an international uproar alleging that the American attacks in heavily populated areas had caused great property damage and civilian casualties. On the 14th, the North Vietnamese informed Marigold’s Polish contacts that they were terminating negotiation conversations. At a meeting with the president the same day, the participants supported suspending repeat strikes on the vehicle depot and railroad yards beause of the “hue and cry” raised by Hanoi over bombing civilians.

McNamara later lamented that these attacks deterred some political leaders in Hanoi who, he believed, favored negotiations, and caused Marigold’s failure. Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly F. Dobrynin subsequently told him that Moscow interpreted the timing of the attacks as Washington’s attempt to apply further military pressure on Hanoi at the start of any secret talks. While the administration appeared to have bungled a serious peace initative by failing to coordinate its military and diplomatic efforts, in fact the intimate group involved in Marigold knew fully about the proposed raids. Uncertainty also surrounded Hanoi’s understanding of the Polish initiative, which may have misled North Vietnamese leaders into believing the United States was willing to stop the bombing without further military conditions–the fundemental communist demand that without was never the American offer. The administration attempted to revive Marigold, and in line with this overture on 23 December the president forbade attacks on targets within 10 nautical miles of Hanoi’s center. Sharp assumed that the White House’s typical refusal to share with him the rationale for the latest prohibition resulted from the enemy’s latest furor over civilian casualties. He complained bitterly about the latest bombing ban when “we were just starting to put some real pressure on Hanoi.”  (Unquote Drea)…

And then— Rolling Thunder and the Vietnam War rolled on, and on … Marigold whithered and died… I wonder if MARIGOLD is a case study in the training of the cadre of “experts” manning our Pentagon, State Department and White House war rooms???… Title: “CROSSED PURPOSES 101″…. Uninended consequences? Ubetcha, 50,000 more American warriors died for a lost cause… Yeah, I can understand why a lot of folks believe: “What difference does it make?” … Unity of Command? whazzat?  

Lest we forget…           Bear           -30-

Your Humble Host now has Marigold in his journal and off his chest… finis…