RIPPLE SALVO… #546… The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings of August 1967 are presented here in small doses over the next nine days while the Bear attends Tailhook ’17… Part I of IX of the Senator John Stennis chaired sessions: an “Introduction” and “The Purposes of the Air War”… but first…
Good Morning: Day FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-SIX of a day-by-day review of a bloody air war fought fifty years ago…
3 SEPTEMBER 1967… HEAD LINES from The New York Times on a mighty nice Sunday in NYC…
VIETNAM: Page 1: “ELECTION IS HELD IN SOUTH VIETNAM; TURNOUT IS HEAVY–170,000 VOTE IN SAIGON IN THE FIRST FOUR HOURS–THIEU PREDICTS VICTORY–FRAUD IS CHARGED AGAIN–REGIME SUSPENDS 2 NEWSPAPERS”... “Thieu Promises To Heed Election Results”... “U.S. Expects Peace Bid after a Fair Election”... “Vote Punctuates History of Strife–Militant Buddhists Agitation Helped Precede Useful Debate”… Page 3: “Allies Discount A U.N. Peace Move in Vietnam–Say A Bombing Pause Must Precede Useful Debate”… “Hanoi Marks National Day”…”The scene Friday as President Ho Chi Minh and other leaders observed the 22nd anniversary of the Republic or North Vietnam.”…
Page 4: “Administration Tells Senators U.S. Plans No Haiphong Raids“…”…told President Johnson did not intend to order a bombing of Haiphong harbor after the elections in South Vietnam…President has authorized bombing attacks on approximately 300 of the 350 significant targets proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 50 left are in very strategic are as primarily the port of Haiphong, Hanoi and the buffer zone along the China border. The decisions to bomb those 50 have not been made”… “Johnson Doesn’t Yield”... “Today, officials said they had heard nothing of any intention of the President to yield to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”…Page 5: “Vietcong Attack Provincial Capital–Fight In Streets In Fifth Such Assault This Week”…”The Vietcong stepped up their terrorist attack today (2nd) on the eve of the election. ..60 killed and 426 were wounded in the last 6 days and 237 were abducted…”...Page 5: “U.S. Convoy Ambushed”… “Twenty-five truck convoy ambushed in Central Highlands killing eight Americans and wounding 18. Highway 19… the enemy withdrew as reinforcements were called in…”
3 September 1967…OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… New York Times (4 Sept reporting 3 Sept ops) Page 5: “In the air war an Air Force F-105 Thunderchief was downed over North Vietnam…the pilot is missing. The plane was the 671st to be lost over the North. During the day Air Force fighter-bombers attacked the Huongvi rail yards 37 miles northeast of Hanoi, the Quangkien rail causeway 39 miles northeast of Hanoi and the Motrang rail bridge and yards 39 miles northwest of the capital city.”…
“Vietnam: Air Losses” (Hobson) There was one fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 3 September 1967…
(1) CAPTAIN HERBERT WILLIAM MOORE was flying an F-105D of the 469th TFS and 388th TFW out of Korat in a flight of four on a strike on a bridge about 55 miles northwest of Dong Hoi when downed by ground fire. CAPTAIN MOORE was hit at rolling-in on his dive bombing run and ejected in the target area. An Air Force SAR unit responded and sighted a parachute on the ground but not CAPTAIN MOORE. His emergency beeper was heard but no voice contact was made. The search was resumed the following day but CAPTAIN MOORE was never seen again. He was posted as MIA with the hope he was a POW, however, when he failed to be returned with the 591 POWs in 1973, he was presumed KIA, body not recovered in 1979. The search for his remains continues as an “active pursuit” by the DOD Joint Recovery Team… As it is, MAJOR MOORE has been left behind, and rests in peace …alone, but not forgotten…
RIPPLE SALVO… #546… THE STENNIS REPORT AUGUST ’67 HEARINGS…THE AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM… PART I of IX …
INTRODUCTION: “Earlier this year many statements appeared in the press which were calculated to belittle the effectiveness of the air campaign over North Vietnam. Many of these statements alleged, or at least implied, that all military targets of significance had been destroyed, that the air campaign had been conducted as effectively as possible, and that continuation of the air campaign was pointless and useless–possibly even prolonging the war itself. At the same time, reports were being circulated that serious consideration was being given in high places to a cessation of the air campaign over North Vietnam, or a substantial curtailment of it. Many of these reports were attributed to unnamed government officials.
“In view of the importance of the air campaign, on June 28, 1967, the subcommittee announced it would conduct an extensive inquiry into the conduct and effectiveness of the bombing campaign over North Vietnam.
“Since commencing hearings on August 9, 1967, we have heard the most knowledgeable and qualified witnesses, including both military leaders and the Secretary of Defense. in order of appearance, the witnesses were Admiral Ulysses S.G. Sharp, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Forces; Admiral Roy Johnson, Commander of the Pacific Fleet; General John Ryan, Commander of the Pacific Air Forces; General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lt. General William W. Momyer, Commander of the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam; General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, US Air Force; Admiral T.H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, US Army; General Wallace Greene, Commandant, US Marine Corps, and Major General Gilbert Meyers, US Air Force (Ret.) formerly Deputy Commander of the Seventh Air Force in Saigon.
“PURPOSE OF THE AIR WAR: It must be emphasized that the air campaign against North Vietnam is a highly important, integral, and truly indispensable part of the overall strategy involved in the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia. Its major objectives are (1) to obstruct, reduce, harass, and impede the flow of war-supporting material and personnel, within North Vietnam and from North Vietnam to South Vietnam; (2) to destroy those military and industrial resources of North Vietnam that contribute most to the support of its aggression; (3) to educe the flow of external assistance being provided to North Vietnam to pay an unacceptable price for its aggression.
“The subcommittee has always recognized that the air war in the North is not a substitute for the ground war in the South Vietnam. We have always considered it to be only one phase, albeit a highly essential and important one, of the overall integrated war effort. those who suggest otherwise merely create a straw man and waster their energy upon the destruction of it.
“That the air campaign has not achieved its objectives to a greater extent cannot be attributed to inability or impotence of airpower. It attests, rather, to the fragmentation of our air might by overly restrictive controls, limitations, and the doctrine of “gradualism” placed on our aviation forces which prevented them from waging the air campaign in the manner and according to the timetable which is best calculated to achieve maximum results.” To be continued…
RTR QUOTE for 3 September: WILLIAM HOOK, sermon, 1640: “A day of battle is a day of harvest for the devil.”…
Lest we forget…. Bear