RIPPLE SALVO… #119… MORE AND MORE… but first…
Good Morning: Day ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN of my review of our nation’s “air war” with North Vietnam fifty years ago…
27 JUNE 1966… ON THE HOME FRONT… New York Times… (“All the news that’s fit to print”) A sunny Monday, with showers likely in New York City…
Page 1: “12,000 End Rights March To Jackson”… “A wave of 12,000 to 15,000 singing, shouting marchers brought the long civil rights march through Mississippi to an end today (Sunday,26th) by crowding around the state capitol and demanding immediate and wide spread reforms to the testament of Negroes. The last eight mile leg of the march started slowly from Tougeloo College but picked up momentum as thousands of Mississippi Negroes in their Sunday best flocked into the column from the street corners, churches and lawns. They argued with policemen, stepped to the tune of a four piece brass band, and cheered when a member of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee burned a confederate flag on Capitol Grounds. Hundreds of National Guard troops, state highway patrolmen and other law enforcement officers, many of them carrying tear gas and riot guns looked on.”
Page 1: “Many In Vietnam Say Opinion In U.S. Is Key to Victory”… “…The GIs in Vietnam tend to feel they can win the war if permitted to remain long enough…”…”An American Major General was recently questioning a North Vietnamese captain who had deserted. The general was curious about the enemy’s policy on rotation of troops and asked, ‘American troops can go home after 12-months, when do your leaders say you can go home?’…NVN captain: ‘They say can go home when we win the war.’… MGEN: ‘What do you think?’…NVN captain: ‘I think we can go home after you win the war.’ To which writer Charles Mohr adds:
“Who is winning? The North Vietnamese officer is one of many people who think the United States, the South Vietnamese and New Zealand allies are clearly winning. Hardly anyone in Vietnam argues that the Americans and South Vietnamese are losing or is in danger of a major military fiasco like the French met at Dienbienphu. But there is a small body of men who believe that the United States is not losing but not winning either and will not begin to win until there has been some success in the subtle battle to gain the allegiance of hostile or neutral parts of the rural population. The wildest feeling of all however is that the outcome will be decided by public opinion in the United States. In a real sense the United States forces in Vietnam are fighting a war while looking over their shoulders toward home.”
Page 1: “Jersey Democrats Consider Rejecting Johnson War Policy”…”A number of New Jersey Democratic leaders alarmed by an apparent grass roots dissatisfaction in the state with President Johnson’s Vietnam policy are seriously considering breaking with the President on the fall election campaign. One of the Democratic party’s most influential state leaders firmly believes that Democratic candidates must come out emphatically in favor of de-escalation of the war and hope that President Johnson “pulls a rabbit out of a hat” in time to avert Republican victories in November. He added: “… and any Democrat who thinks he can drop the Vietnam thing out of the election will be campaigning in dreamland.”
Page 1: “Rusk Sees No Hint Of An Early Peace”…”Secretary of State Dean Rusk said on arrival here (in Canberra, Australia) today for the 111th annual meeting of the SEATO that he saw no prospect of an early peace in Vietnam. The Secretary said that North Vietnam will not be permitted to seize South Vietnam by force and that there will be peace when Hanoi gives up its intention to attempt a seizure. I see no prospect of peace at this time.”… Meanwhile, in Washington, Under Secretary George Ball, the leading Dove in the circle of LBJ closest advisors, said: “Hanoi must promptly show some interest in peace or we will attempt by heavier bombing to force them to peace.”… and… “One of the gratifying aspects of service in the Johnson Administration is the fact that the President insists on hearing every side of every question. We make decisions by a kind of adversary procedure in which matters argued out and argued out in great detail, and I have played a part in this and very often played a part at the request of the President who has asked me to take one side or the other or even to argue each side in turn on a particular question.”
27 June 1966…PRESIDENT’s DAILY BRIEF…CIA (TS sanitized)… South Vietnam: Ky may now be gearing up to crack down on the five generals who “contributed to the unstable conditions” in I Corps area during the last three months. (extensive redacting) …Tam Chau, in a press conference interview today hedged on whether the Buddhists would continue to demand the resignation of Ky and Thieu, or would boycott the September elections. Chau’s attitude, along with other indications, suggests that the Buddhists may be trying to reach a settlement with the government. (No North Vietnam notes)…
27 JUNE 1966…ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS…NYT (28 June page 1, reporting 27 June ops): “Navy Jets Smash Large Fuel Dump”…fireball raises 3,000 feet in attack on underground depot in North Vietnam…”United States Navy pilots attacked a large underground fuel dump 35 miles northeast of Vinh yesterday. The facility was one of the largest petroleum storage areas hit by American bombers so far. The planes, A-6 Intruders, unleashed 24 of their 500-pounders on the target. As the planes swooped away the flames and smoke gushed upward a pilot following said he had to swerve to avoid the debris. Sailors on the carrier Constellation, the fighter-bomber base 150-miles off shore, said they saw the smoke from the ship. Other pilots returning to the ship from missions thirteen hours after the attack could see the fires and wreckage still burning. The attack yesterday was the first on the Yen Bay petroleum storage area. Last week, however, United States Air Force pilots hit seven similar storage areas 30-miles from Hanoi. After the raids near Hanoi last Tuesday and Wednesday pilots reported extensive fires and a number of large explosions set off by the 1000-pound and 3000-pound (?) bombs that were dropped in eleven strikes. A photo released today showed heavy damage to a fuel dump 40 miles north of the capital city. The pilots said they left the depot in flames and smoke to 1500-feet.”…”Navy pilots yesterday also knocked out 19 railroad cars in two attacks–one north of Vinh and the other south of Thanh hoa. At the same time Air Force pilots attacked a surface-to-air missile site 35 miles southeast of Vinh. There were no reports of damage.”…In the south, B-52s completed Arc Light missions 65 miles west of Danang and 55-miles southwest of Saigon.”…”Vietnam: Air Losses”… page 63…Two Navy A-4Es downed…
(1) LCDR GENE ALBERT SMITH was flying an A-4E of the VA-155 Silver Foxes embarked in USS Constellation in a flight of four A-4s striking barges in a canal 30 miles south of Thanh Hoa when the flight leader observed a large fireball on the ground a short distance from the targets. When radio calls to LCDR SMITH went unanswered the flight leader took the flight back to the target area and conducted a visual search of the site of the large fireball and concluded that the crater and debris at the site could be an aircraft. SAR aircraft combed the scene for two hours without any results. LCDR SMITH was subsequently declared Killed in Action and his remains were returned to the United States by the North Vietnamese in 1988. Fifty years ago on this date LCDR GENE SMITH gave up his life for his country…
(2) An A-4E from the VA-212 Rampant Raiders embarked in USS Hancock was lost while the ship and air wing were operating at Dixie Station and supporting combat operations south of Saigon. the aircraft had an engine fire en route to the target and the pilot was forced to eject. He was rescued. Chris Hobson in “Vietnam: Air Losses” notes: “This was the last Navy aircraft lost on a combat mission over South Vietnam before the Navy flew its final mission from Dixie Station on 4 August. By that time enough Air Force and Marine aircraft had arrived at South Vietnam bases to relieve the Navy of assistance in the in-country war. However, later in the war the Navy participated in further combat operations over the South, but from this date onward its main area of operations would be North Vietnam.”
RIPPLE SALVO… #119… REQUIREMENTS… Wars are expensive. Expanding wars increases the demand for men and money to meet the growing requirements of the forces in the theater of combat. The Office of Secretary of Defense was responsible for determining valid requirements, identifying the scarce resources needed to fulfill the fully justified requirements, then pursuing the funds from the legislative branch that the President agreed were needed to carry out his Vietnam plans and policies. In mid-1966 the expanding war brought the cost of the war into full sunlight. For example, in early January 1966 the number of combat support personnel, “the support tail as opposed to the combat teeth,” requested by MACV in Saigon was increased by 100,000 without explanation or justification. Pursuit of the money to fund this unexpected, unexplained and perhaps unjustified requirement was impossible. So Secretary McNamara set up an office within his Systems Analysis Division (Alain Enthoven’s Whiz Kids) in February 1966 to validate the requirement inputs from all the Defense Department’s big spenders. This did not sit well with the Joint Chiefs of Staff , who regarded this change as a way to bypass the Joint Chiefs and an indication that they were losing a piece of their turf. Lots of ruffled feathers. In addition to recognized difficulty in determining, and now validating requirements was the unstable and deteriorating political situation in South Vietnam during the period of March trough June of 1966– the period covered in detail (?) in the first 118 RTR posts. At this point President Johnson had three options to consider: (1) continue as usual anticipating that the political turmoil would be resolved, (2) pressure Saigon to negotiate with the Vietcong, or (3) prepare to disengage. LBJ decided on alternative one, press on. This was the state of affairs in mid-June 1966. Into this came an expanded requirement request from CINCPAC… The following is quoted from Edward Drea’s Volume VI of the Secretary of Defense Historical Series, pages 125-126:
“In mid-June 1966, Admiral sharp submitted revised requirements asking for 475,000 U.S. and 46,000 allied troops in Vietnam by the end of 1966 plus a further increase of 84,000 during 1967. Sharp also wanted additional forces of 148,000 men by December 1966 and 172,000 by the end of 1967 elsewhere in the western Pacific to include a contingency corps (a theater reserve) either to shorten the war, if the opportunity appeared, or to offset future enemy buildups. Meanwhile, Westmoreland was appealing for still more troops because of his growing concern about an enemy buildup in South Vietnam’s centrqal highlands. The President responded on 28 June 1966 (FIFTY YEARS AGO TOMORROW) by asking McNamara to expedite scheduled deployments to Southeast Asia.
“McNamara and Enthoven traveled to Hawaii for an 8 July briefing in another attempt to reconcile military strategy with the administration’s political objectives. On arrival, McNamara told the press he was cautiously optimistic about military progress, an official attitude he maintained after returning to Washington, though advising reporters not to expect a short war. IN CRUDEST TERMS, THE COMMUNISTS WERE FIELDING MEN FASTER THAN THE ALLIES COULD KILL THEM (my bold letters). A National Intelligence estimate issued in early July 1966 estimated that the VC and NVA would gain 50,000 men during 1966 and grow to a force of about 125,000. So long as the enemy brought in these reinforcements, MACV would not likely meet goals developed after the February conference in Honolulu, such as securing population centers, opening lines of communication (LOCs), or denying base areas to the enemy. To achieve these agreed on objectives, PACOM had to have the additional forces requested in mid-June. The accompanying campaign plan would mass 65 per cent of the ground forces in the northern provinces of South Vietnam to a war of attrition against NVA regulars. Total PACOM requirements by the end of 1967, including areas outside of south Vietnam, numbered nearly 800,000, including aabout 59,000 allied troops; with the desired contingency troops, the number would increase to more than 950,000 troops.”
Let that sink in, dear readers. Think guns or butter for a moment. At the same time the Vietnam requirements are ballooning, the civil rights marchers are in high gear, the LBJ Great Society is stalled, inflation has become a problem, the draft issues have fired up the 18-26 year olds and their folks, the nation is dividing into two camps–hawks and doves, it is an election year, the Soviets are restless, and both the Chinese and Soviets are fully committed to deliver whatever Ho Chi Minh asks for. That’s where we were fifty years ago on 27 June 1966…
Lest we forget,,, Bear ……… –30– ………