RIPPLE SALVO…#84… INTERDICTION…
Good Morning: Day EIGHTY-FOUR in a 26-month review of Operation Rolling Thunder…one day at time…
22 MAY 1966… ON THE HOME FRONT… (NYT)… A rainy Sunday morning in NYC, then fair…
Page 1: “Johnson Appeals For Unity In War”... President Johnson urged Americans to be patient in the midst of the strife in Vietnam, both with the war with North Vietnam and the ongoing dissension in South Vietnam. The President called a cadre of newsmen into the Oval Office and read a statement: “We regret any diversion away from the war on the Vietcong. And we regret any diversion from our efforts to defeat the Communist attempt to take over South Vietnam. Because we have dissent does not mean we have been dissected.” In the Q&A the President noted a drop in popular support for the war and his handling of it, even as the nation has made more sacrifices. The President’s words came as Premier Ky’s troops took on dissidents in Hue, Danang and Saigon. U.S. Marine aircraft circled the confrontations in Hue and Danang but did not intervene… Page 1: “5th Avenue Sit-down Holds Up Parade Of Armed Forces” as less than 100 demonstrators broke through barricades and blocked the progress of the 10,000 men parade for about five minutes. The parade resumed as the police carried the protestors away in vans. The protestors included 18 women and bunches of flowers. Signage said: “Stop the War in Vietnam.”… “President Finds Economy Firm Despite Price Rise; Silent On Tax Issue”… calls a press conference to report the good economic news. His remarks were taken as a hint that prospects for a tax increase are lower as inflation increases, providing a mixed blessing for consumers and tax payers…. Page 1; Sports box: Cassius Clay defeats Henry Cooper in the 6th round of a fight in London and the horse Kauai King, winner of the Kentucky Derby repeats in the Preakness…
Page 2: “Pentagon Worried By Dissidence In Vietnam”…“It’s going to be damned hard to justify to American mothers the sending of their boys to Vietnam unless those people out there get together,” said a senior officer. “It looks like we were doing alright in combat until South Vietnamese factionalism and dissidence interfered with military operations.” In 1965 the US lost 1,365 KIA and SVN lost 11,200. Through April 1966 the US losses are 3311 and SVN 570, Which, said one officer, is “a reflection of reduced SVN participation in the fighting at the same time NVN and Vietcong forces are building.” Meanwhile, the agitation by youths in Saigon continues to build….
Page 4: “Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and a South Carolina Democrat, said he thought the port of Haiphong in North Vietnam should have been knocked out yesterday. “I don’t think America is going to tolerate the fratricidal strife and attacks on the boys. This is something we didn’t anticipate. I am getting tired of it. We may have to make a decision about whether or not to pull out of Vietnam altogether.” Representative Sam Stratton, Democrat from New York, who had just returned from a 10-day tour in South Vietnam said: “The American press has grievously failed in giving the American people an accurate and unbiased account of the progress in the Vietnam war”… “250,000 Students Take Draft Test; Protests Are Few” College students took the tests for draft deferment consideration at 1,150 sites and demonstrations occurred at only three of the sites–Stanford, Roosevelt University in Chicago and St. Vincents in Latrobe, Pennsylvania. Senator Richard Russell took advantage of the test day to call for universal military training and commenting that “the lottery is fairer than what we have today.” Senator Jacob Javits stated that youth should have their choice of service with a military choice involving a 2-year contract and other non-military choices a three year contract.
Editorial Page: “McNamara On Security,” editorial comments on his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Montreal…
“In the thermonuclear age the search for security is really the search for viable ways of keeping the peace. McNamara sketched out three necessary and complimentary approaches. They are : (1) Economic development…of the poor nations, more effective political arrangements among the older, wealthier nations (powers) for sharing the burdens of running an orderly world, and (3) building bridges of understanding between the great ideological rivals, notably the U.S. and China.
“There is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness.”And, what the world needs now: “…a spirit of realism that would not be hardened and inflexible, but restlessly creative and full of practical alternatives.”
22 MAY 1966…ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS… Reported in NYT 23 May… In North Vietnam the United States Navy pilots dropped 2000-pound bombs on a multi-span bridge on route 15, 20 miles northwest of the major city of Haiphong; strafed an ammunition train 17 miles northwest of Thanh Hoa: and destroyed 15 railroad cars. Air Force pilots struck a radar site 76 miles southwest of Hanoi and destroyed 10 supply trucks 66 miles from Hanoi. Aircraft losses: one F-105D from the 469th TFS and 388th TFW out of Korat flown by 1LT. R.H. HACKFORD, USAF shot down while attacking a truck park in the Ban Karai Pass. 1LT HACKFORD was able to fly the aircraft 15 miles northeast of the target area before ejecting. He was rescued by an Air Force SAR helicopter.
RIPPLE SALVO…#84… STOP THE FLOW… IN OR OUT (OR BOTH)???
The President and all his Principals, and all the agencies with a ticket to participate, spent the months of April and May 1966 cogitating and dissecting the first fourteen months of the air war against North Vietnam–Rolling Thunder–then rolling all their deep thinking and best advice into a memo to the President that provided the Commander-in-Chief three alternatives for redirecting the Rolling Thunder effort and a recommendation on the alternative that offered the best course for pursuing the objectives of the campaign. Which were:
“The limited overall US objective, in terms of the narrow U.S. commitment and not the wider U.S. preferences, is to take action (so long as they help themselves to see that the people of South Vietnam are permitted to determine their own future. Our commitment is to stop (or generously to offset when we cannot stop) North Vietnamese military intervention in the South, so that ‘the board will not be tilted’…The sub-objectives, at which our bombing campaign in the North has always been aimed, are these:
(1) To retaliate and to lift the morale of the people in the South, including the Americans, who are being attacked by agents of the North.
(2) To add to the pressure on Hanoi to end the war.
(3) To reduce the flow and/or to increase the cost of infiltrating men and material from North to South.
Three alternative air war programs were set forth in the memo that went to the President…
Alternative A. Intensified attack on Hanoi-Haiphong logistical base. Continue attacks on enemy installations and industry and conduct an intensified, concurrent and sustained effort against all elements of land, sea and air lines of communication in North Vietnam–especially those entering and departing the Hanoi-Haiphong areas. Foreign shipping to be shouldered out of Haiphong by a series of air attacks that close in on the center of the port complex. The harbor and approaches would be mined, forcing foreign shipping out into the nearby estuaries for offloading by lighterage. Intensive and systematic armed reconnaissance would be carried out against roads and railroads from China. The eight major operational airfields would be attacked and the deep-water ports of Cam Pha and Hon Gai would be struck or mined as required.
Alternative B. Emphasis on the infiltration routes south of the 20th Parallel. Under this alternative, the dominant emphasis would be, not on preventing material from FLOWING INTO North Vietnam (and thus not on economic pressure on the regime), but on preventing military men and material from FLOWING OUT of North Vietnam. We would terminate bombing in the Red River basin except for occasional sorties necessary to keep enemy air defenses and damage-repair crews positioned there and to keep important fixed targets knocked out. Strike operations would be concentrated in the neck of North Vietnam, between the 17th and 20th parallels. The effort would be sustained and intensive and designed to saturate the choke points and to complement new intensive interdiction efforts in adjacent areas in Laos and near the 17th Parallel inside South Vietnam.
Alternative C. Extension of the current program. This alternative would be essentially a refinement of the currently approved program and therefore a compromise between Alternative A and Alternative B. Under it, while avoiding attacks within the 10-mile prohibited zone around Hanoi and strikes at or mining the ports, we would conduct heavy effort against all other land, sea, and air lines of communication. Important fixed targets would be kept knocked out; intensive, sustained and systematic armed reconnaissance would be carried out against the roads and railroads and costal shipping throughout the country; and the eight major airfields would be systematically attacked. The total number of sorties would be the same as under the other two options.
And Secretary McNamara’s concluding paragraph presented his advice…
“I am convinced that, within the limits to which we can go with prudence, ‘strategic’ bombing of North Vietnam will at best be unproductive. I am convinced that mining the ports would not only be unproductive, but very costly in domestic and world support and very dangerous–running high risks of enlarging the war as the program is carried out, frustrated and with no choice but to escalate further. At the same time, I am doubtful that bombing the infiltration routes north or south of 20-degrees will put a meaningful ceiling on men and material entering South Vietnam. Nevertheless, I recommend Alternative B (which emphasizes bombing the area between the 17th and 20th parallels) because (1) it holds highest promise of serving a military purpose, (2) it will cost the least in pilots’ lives, and (3) it is consistent with efforts to move toward negotiations.
“Implicit in the recommendation is a conviction that nothing short of toppling the Hanoi regime will pressure North Vietnam to settle so long as they believe they have a chance to win the ‘war of attrition’ in the South, a judgment that actions sufficient to topple the Hanoi regime will put us into war with the Soviet Union and China, and a belief that a shift to Alternative B can be timed and handled in such a way as to gain politically while not endangering the morale of our fighting men.”
Next: The President’s decision for “Rolling Thunder 57” going forward… “Mr. President, think of North Vietnam as a funnel. Nothing is made in North Vietnam, everything comes in, FLOWs IN, and after a 400-mile FLOW THROUGH, it FLOWs OUT to keep the war going in the South…where do you want us to install the cut off switch?…”
Lest we forget…. Bear ………. –30– ……….