RIPPLE SALVO… #912… THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF ROLLING THUNDER TOLD IN TWO PAGES FROM THE HISTORY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE…The last gasp down the path to CESSATION… but first…
Good Morning…Day NINE HUNDRED TWELVE of commemorating the 50th anniversary of Operation Rolling Thunder and the men who took the war to the North Vietnamese in their homeland for 44 consecutive months…
HEAD LINES from The New York Times on Monday, 2 September 1968…
THE WAR: Page 1: “FOE HITS DANANG WITH BIG ROCKETS–10 Civilians Killed, 43 Wounded”…”The city of Danang came under a heavy enemy attack this morning. At least to civilians were killed and 43 injured when the large 122-mm rockets crashed into several heavily populated areas along the Danang waterfront. The South Vietnamese command here said that 25 rockets had been fired into the city during the shelling that began shortly after 2 a.m…. Most of the rockets crashed into private homes… Yesterday, enemy troops continued to attack Special Forces outposts in various parts of the country in what appeared to be a drive to strike at lightly defended outposts…the United States command said that 65 North Vietnamese soldiers were killed during an engagement with a mechanized infantry unit about a half a mile north of Conthien near the DMZ… two Americans were killed and 24 wounded in the fighting… Page 2: “SPOOKY THE PLANE HAILED IN VIETNAM–Air Force Gunships Have Firepower of Battalion”… “…Again and again over the past 14 days, the Spookies have proven to be a major factor in repelling the new wave of assaults that the enemy has launched against eight allied outposts and several cities and towns. During the three nights that the Duclap camp was under heavy siege, Spookies fired 714,000 bullets at the North Vietnamese assault force. Then they returned for three consecutive nights after the siege was broken to fire on the rear guard units that were covering the enemy’s retreat. In all the Spookies fired more than a million bullets at Duclap.”…
PEACE TALKS: “HUMPHREY TO NIXON: SHOW UNITY TO HANOI ON PEACE TALKS IN PARIS”…”Vice President Humphrey proposed to Richard M. Nixon today that they put North Vietnam on notice she cannot expect to profit at the peace talks from their partisan debate in the Presidential campaign. If both parties reassert their basic commitment to the success of the negotiations in Paris, Mr. Humphrey said, North Vietnam should understand that it would not gain concessions after the elections through a change in Presidents. ‘Both political parties in their platforms pledged their commitment to an honorable and lasting peace in Southeast Asia. Neither political party in its platform gave any reason to the Government of North Vietnam to conclude that it could obtain advantage in further delay in the negotiating processes. I believe that a political settlement, through negotiations, will be advanced if both parties serve notice on North Vietnam that we support the effort of our negotiators…. North Vietnam must understand that a political campaign in the United States will not result in our granting to North Vietnam concessions which it cannot obtain through the legitimate processes of negotiation now under way in Paris. The time to negotiate is now, not later. The time to stop the killing is now, not later.”
2 SEPTEMBER 1968… OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER…New York Times (3 Sept reporting 2 Sept ops) Page 3: “BOMBING CONTINUES IN THE NORTH”… “Over southern North Vietnam American jets continue to pound enemy storage areas and supply routes despite intermittent rainstorms and broken cloud layers. Aviators said that in 110 missions they destroyed or damaged 29 supply boats, 7 trucks and 27 warehouses, and three bridges. They also ignited more than 30 fires and set off 30 secondary explosions… Along the coast of North Vietnam the United States destroyer Rupertus was fired upon repeatedly as the vessel’s guns pounded coastal defense sites. The ship was not hit.”… VIETNAM: AIR LOSSES (Chris Hobson) There were two fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 2 September 1968…
(1) The VA-86 Sidewinders embarked in USS America lost an A-7A when the pilot hit–ricochet off– the water while on the attack on waterborne logistic craft. He was forced to eject. He was rescued after the great adventure…
(2) MAJOR DONALD S. CARR, USMC, was flying an A-4E of the VMA-311 Tomcats out of Chu Lai on an armed recce mission near the A Shau Valley and was hit by ground fire recovering from a bomb run. MAJOR CARR headed east, his Skyhawk aflame. He was forced to eject near Phu Luc, 25 miles northwest of Danang and was rescued by helicopter.
SUMMARY OF ROLLING THUNDER LOSSES (KIA/MIA/POW) FOR THE FOUR 2 SEPTEMBER DAYS IN THE FOUR YEARS OF THE OPERATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM
1966, 1968…NONE…
1967… MAJOR WILLIAM GEORGE BENNETT, USAF… (KIA)… Refer to RTR of 2-Sept-67
1965… CAPTAIN JAMES QUINCY COLLINS, USAF… (POW)… AMONG THE BRAVE… GALLANTRY AND INTREPIDITY IN ACTION… The first of two awards of the SILVER STAR… Citation:
“CAPTAIN JAMES G. COLLINS, JR. distinguished himself by gallantry in connection with military operations against an opposing armed force in Southeast Asia on 2 September 1965. On that date CAPTAIN COLLINS was tasked with the destruction of a heavily defended bridge vital for supply to the insurgent forces. The importance of the bridge to the opposing force was underscored by the heavy concentration of antiaircraft and automatic weapons placed in the area. As CAPTAIN COLLINS dove his aircraft toward the target the sky became blanketed with exploding projectiles and at the precise weapons release point his aircraft sustained a direct hit. Despite being urged by his wingman to abandon the aircraft, CAPTAIN COLLINS courageously continued to fly his crippled aircraft toward the target, delivering his bomb load with devastating accuracy. By his gallantry and devotion to duty, CAPTAIN COLLINS has reflected great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.”
Captain Collins was flying an F-105D of te 36th TFS and 6441st TFW on TDY out of Takhli on an armed reconnaissance mission over North Vietnam and was downed in the attack on a bridge near Xung Lung just north of the Laotian border about 80 miles west of Hanoi. He suffered a severe injury–left femur broken in three places–in the low altitude ejection and was quickly captured by the North Vietnamese. Captain Collins endured 2,721 days of harsh captivity with honor before his release in February 1973. Colonel Collins has continued his service to the country and his community and on this 53rd anniversary of one of the most memorable days in his life Humble Host extends highest respect an admiration for his life well lived in the service of others…
RIPPLE SALVO… #912…Humble Host pulls a couple of pages from Edward J. Drea’s Volume VI of the Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969 to provide a roadmap for the last two months of the bombing of North Vietnam under the banner of Operation Rolling Thunder. A longer than usual post, but a complete telling of this tells a better story than if done in pieces… Get a cup of coffee…I quote (Pages 230-232)…
THE LEAD UP TO THE LAST TWO MONTHS… “Clifford spent the weekend of 3-4 August at the Texas ranch where the president was entertaining guests; on Sunday afternoon he managed a private meeting with Johnson to discuss his plan. Arguing that the war could not be won militarily Clifford proposed an end to the bombing in exchange for Hanoi’s agreement to mutually deescalate, stop violations in the DMZ, and end attacks on Saigon. He suggested Kosygin as an intermediary to bring Hanoi to the table. Playing on the president’s vanity, he observed that a peace settlement would be the administration’s greatest accomplishment. Johnson disagreed with his defense secretary’s major points, claiming ‘he’d rather [leave] office with a ‘fine military solution than be craven’. Still, the President left the door open to the initiative by asking Clifford to put his thoughts on paper and discuss them with Rusk. Johnson was still unwilling to give up completely on the bombing campaign to so so would admit a major policy failure and further encourage his domestic opponents.
“The president blew hot and cold. In early September, he reckoned that if they could persevere a few more weeks ‘with our present posture’ it could convince Hanoi that it would not get a better deal by writing. But by mid-month, Clifford characterized the president’s mood as impatient and more pugnacious: ‘It’s: ‘I’m God-damned if I’ll stop the bombing without something from the other side!’ almost concurrently, in a 15 September cable from Paris, Harriman quoted North Vietnam’s top negotiator as stating that his government was prepared to begin worthwhile discussions the day after the United States stopped bombing his country.
“Clifford was at Camp David with the president when the cable arrived. Johnson indicated that if the situation in Czechoslovakia remained quiet, he would seek Kosygin’s assurance of a quid pro quo: if North Vietnam ceased its violations of the DMZ, stopped attacking South Vietnamese cities, and entered into negotiations that included South Vietnamese representatives, then the United States would stop the bombing. Bright hopes for substantive negotiations soon dimmed as another lengthy round of procedural discussions ensued in Paris. By late September, Clifford, Ball (at UN), and Nitze (#2 at Defense) favored a unilateral bombing cessation, while Rusk, Wheeler and the president opposed such a step without some reciprocity.
“Talks remained deadlocked into early October when the CIA reported the withdrawal of numerous North Vietnamese units from South Vietnam into Laos or Cambodia. It also became clear that the communists’ third offensive of 1968, launched in mid-August, had failed, leaving MACV far less apprehensive about the consequences of a bombing halt. On 11 October North Vietnamese representatives in Paris showed signs of getting down to business: the following day the Soviet embassy in Paris informed (Cyrus) Vance (#2 U.S. Negotiator) of Hanoi’s willingness to enter substantive negotiations and to include participation of Saigon representatives in such talks once the bombing stopped.
“On 14 October the president had a series of meetings with the JCS, congressional leaders, and his own senior advisors to discuss the recent development before making a decision. Clifford supposing that something that happened to weaken the resolve of the North Vietnamese, thought the administration had to test Hanoi’s good faith by shifting its position on reciprocity. Wheeler noted that unlike with previous pauses North Vietnam had made an important move and agreed to honor the DMZ, not shell the South’s cities, and accept South Vietnamese participation in the talks. However, it seemed to General Westmoreland, now Army chief of staff that the political pressure of the approaching presidential election was ‘encouraging concessions to the enemy without due consideration to future implications.’ Nonetheless he too acquiesced in the president’s course. Armed with consensus, Johnson instructed (Averell) Harriman to press the North Vietnamese for an agreement on a date to cease the bombing. Peace negotiations would begin a day later.
“The president also sought reassurance from General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker that Hanoi would not use any respite to reconstitute its battered forces for another round of attacks. Conceding that hard fighting lay ahead, on 14 October the general and ambassador saw not possibility fro another large-scale enemy offensive, were confident allied morale and fighting spirit could be maintained during negotiations, and believed the North serious about talks as evidenced by Hanoi’s decision to include Saigon representatives in the discussions. Johnson also gained support from General Momyer, now back in the United States as commander of the Tactical Air Command, who agreed that a bombing halt over North Vietnam at the current time posed minimal risks to U.S. forces.
“As the administration prepared to announce the bombing cessation, however, the North Vietnamese delegates imposed new conditions such as a written statement committing Washington to an ‘unconditional’ bombing halt, an interval between the end of the bombing and the beginning of the talks, and the inclusion of the communist National Liberation Front representatives as a separate party at the negotiating table. Hanoi’s backsliding may have stemmed from Peking’s displeasure with its ally’s decision to accept South Vietnamese representatives, thereby giving legal standing to the ‘puppet regime’ in Saigon.
“Clifford remained unwilling to end the air campaign unless both sides agreed on a definite date to begin talks. to do otherwise would lay the president open to criticism that with nothing to show in exchange he had stopped the bombing solely to influence the November elections. On 27 October Hanoi conceded that it would open talks within four days of the bombing halt, agreed on as 29 October; it dropped all other proposals, thus eliminating Clifford’s objections. Two days later, avoiding public attention, Abrams flew from Saigon to Washington to confer in the early morning hours wih the president, on the verge of making his final decision. Abrams unconditionally supported a cessation, much to the relief of Clifford who had not been entirely sure how the field commander would respond.
“Clifford described the final days leading to the 31 October presidential announcement as a ‘roller coaster’ ride. Seemingly firm decisions collapsed, disagreement between Saigon’s leaders and Washington flared, critics abounded, and rumors floated that leading Republicans were telling South Vietnam’s President Thieu not to cooperate with Johnson who would soon be out of office. Despite the last-minute flurry of distractions and complications, at the NSC meeting held 31 October the president announced that he would go ahead with a bombing suspension to test the good faith of the North Vietnamese. After listing all the military and civilian officials whose support he had requested and received, he asked each attendee if he disagreed; no one did. In a national radio and television address that evening, Johnson announced an end to bombardment of North Vietnam of any kind as of 8:00 a.m., 1 November, Washington time, talks would commence five days later. Rolling Thunder ended as it had unfolded–troubled, contentious and inconclusive.”… End quote from Drea…
The above provides a two month sketch of Rolling Thunder to come from the Washington point of view. The daily RTR posts will continue to cover the flying, fighting and dying in Southeast Asia as the air war over the North grinds on… Humble Host will however take advantage of the slowdown to reduce the weekend posts to bare bones. I will continue daily posts through calendar year 2018… Lord willing…
RTR Quote for 2 September: DAVID VISCOTT: “The meaning of life is to find your gift. The purpose of life is to give it away.”…
Lest we forget… Bear