RIPPLE SALVO… #788… “DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPROMISE OF OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BROADCAST MESSAGE ON BOARD USS PUEBLO (AGER-2)”… In March 1969 a report was prepared by a joint team of members of the nation’s intelligence agencies to assess the damage to our combat operations, including our ongoing air war with North Vietnam, wrought by the loss of 7-8,000 messages believed to be aboard USS Pueblo at the time of her capture by North Korea on 23 January 1968. Portions –pertinent air operations–of the 46-page study are included here: summary, conclusions and a few recommendations…
SUMMARY… “The acquisition of a nearly complete three-week file (5-23 Jan 68) of Westpac Operational Intelligence Broadcasts (GOPI) message traffic is without a doubt extremely valuable to the Communists. The traffic covers a wide spectrum of intelligence subject matter and provides an excellent overview of U.S. communications intelligence collection and processing requirements, interest, and collection capabilities in Southeast Asia. However, the volume of the compromised material, the subjective format, and the general perishability of combat intelligence are factors which prevent rapid enemy exploitation of these types of materials. For these reasons some of the compromised material was of doubtful tactical intelligence value to the enemy…… AIR DEFENSE AND GENERAL AIR ACTIVITY: Intelligence on Communist and Cambodian air activity is contained in a wide variety of reports ranging from TACREPs to end-product summaries. The reports cover all phases of air activity, but a large portion of the air-related reports concern North Vietnamese air defense. The majority of North Vietnamese air defense reports are tactical in nature used to support friendly operations in Southeast Asia and were consequently of short-term value. A lesser amount of reports were summaries which covered subjects of longer term interest as (two lines redacted). These reports displayed a thorough knowledge of the subject matter, including information on subordination, order of battle, past history, and unusual activity…. ELECTRONIC WARFARE: Messages contained in the GOPI traffic provided detailed information regarding U.S. capabilities to intercept and exploit North Vietnamese communication associated with air, surface-to-air and early warning/air surveillance defenses. While these communications provided extensive information on a variety of defense operations, they were also exploited to provide threat advisory warnings to U.S. aircraft and to develop electronic order of battle. U.S. capabilities to provide electronic warfare support through intercept of radar and IFF emissions were also revealed. In addition to providing threat advisory warnings, messages in the GOPI traffic also disclosed U.S. efforts to actively counter North Vietnamese defenses through the employment of radar and VHF communications jamming.”… Much of the intelligence detail was perishable but its value to the enemy rests in the revelation of the depth of U.S. collection programs, the evaluation processes of data, and dissemination and use of the final products PUEBLO GOPI traffic provided an indication of U.S. success in exploiting enemy communications and the heavy dependence on COMINT in tactical operations.”…. CONCLUSIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS below in Ripple Salvo…
GOOD MORNING… Day SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT of another look at an air war fought fifty years ago by a cadre of America’s bravest of the brave…
HEAD LINES from THE NEW YORK TIMES for Thursday, 2 May 1968…
THE WAR: Page 4: “FIVE ENEMY OFFICERS KILLED IN BATTLE–ONE COMMANDED BATTALION ALLIES MAULED NEAR HUE”… “Five North Vietnamese officers, including a battalion commander, have been killed infighting near Hue in which an enemy battalion was virtually wiped out. The officers–the commander, his executive officer and three company officers–were from the Eighth Battalion, 90th Regiment of the North Vietnamese Army. In three days of fighting four miles northeast of the old imperial capital of Hue, allied troops killed or captured all but a handful of the battalion’s men… 352 North Vietnamese had been killed and 95 captured… Allied losses were reported as eight killed and 37 wounded….In a 10-hour battle yesterday 10 miles northwest of Hue, the paratroopers reported killing 82 more enemy soldiers, apparently members of nother unit. The paratroopers lost one dead and eight wounded…. At midafternoon yesterday, North Vietnamese troops attacked a United States Marine unit two miles northwest of the supply base at Dongha. the marines called in tanks, artillery and fighter-bombers and turned the attack back but lost nine men dead and 43 wounded. The marines killed 25 North Vietnamese in the two hours of fighting…”… Page 1: “MILITARY MEN SAID TO URGE END OF CURBS ON BOMBING”… “Some senior American military officials are reported to have begun to argue for a resumption of American bombing throughout North Vietnam. The report came as a new gesture was made in the diplomatic situation. The White House announced Washington’s acceptance of an Indonesian proposal that preliminary talks with North Vietnam be held in neutral waters aboard an Indonesian ship, possibly the heavy cruiser Irian…. senior military officials contend that the delay over agreement on a site for preliminary talks on Vietnam and reports of heavy infiltration and southward movement of North Vietnamese troops indicated that Hanoi is not interested in peace. The argument is reported to have been advanced in recent days by the headquarters of Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, commander-in-chief of Pacific forces, who has responsibility for the air war against North Vietnam. It has apparently been supported by the headquarters of General William C. Westmoreland the American commander in Saigon (where is Abrams?)…There was no indication, however, that the President was preparing to lift the restrictions he put in place on 31 March.”….
Page 1: “COLUMBIA OFFERS TO MEET LEADERS OF HARLEM ON GYM–BOARD ALSO CALLS FOR STUDY OF WAYS TO GIVE STUDENTS AND FACULTY BIGGER ROLE–Talks Follow A Melee–6 Youths and 5 policemen Hurt in Clash–Dropping of Charges is Urged:… Page 1: “U.S. WILL PAY 6%–HIGHEST SINCE 1920–TREASURY SETS PEAK RATE FOR 2 NEW NOTES DESPITE PROGRESS ON TAX RISE”… Page 1: “16 NATIONS OFFER TO SPEED TARIFF CUT ON U.S. EXPORTS–Seek To Narrow Payments Gap–Move Is Conditional On No New Import Bars By Washington”…Page 3: “LEFTIST SWING IN CHINA IS SEEN–Militants Led By Mao’s Wife Termed In Ascendance”… Page 3: “HO CHI MINH PRESIDES AT MAY DAY CELEBRATION IN HANOI”…”…makes rare public appearance and the crowd cheered. He gave a seat beside him to a little girl who had given him flowers.”… Page 5: “Two Soldiers In Same Battle Get Medal Of Honor In Rare Double Ceremony”… “President Johnson placed stars of bronze on pale blue ribbons around the necks of two brave soldiers toy. It was a rare event–a double ceremony awarding the Medal of Honor, the highest award this nation gives for courage, to two members of the same Army infantry company. The two men were Captain Robert F. Foley…and Sgt. John F. Baker, Jr.”… Page 27: “KENNEDY PRODS JOHNSON GENTLY ON SELECTION OF PEACE TALKS SITE”…
STATE DEPARTMENT. OFFICE OF HISTORIAN. HISTORICAL DOCUMENT. FOREIGN RELATIONS. 1964-68 VIETNAM. One document of interest for 2 May 1968, Ambassador Bunker’s 48th weekly report from Saigon to Secretary of State Rusk and the President in Washington… Three stars…
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d218
2 MAY 1968…OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… No coverage of air operations north of the demilitarized zone… “Vietnam: Air Losses” (Chris Hobson) There was one fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 2 May 1968…However, the loss of 1LT ROBERT D. AVERY, USMC, and 1LT THOMAS D. CLEM, USMC in an A-6A is also on record as having been lost on 3 May 1968… RTR will report loss tomorrow…
SUMMARY OF ROLLING THUNDER LOSSES (KIA/MIA/POW) ON 2 MAY FOR THE FOUR YEARS OF OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… WE REMEMBER…
1965… NONE…
1966… LCDR WALTER SMITH WOOD, USN… (KIA)
1967… NONE…
1968… NONE…
RIPPLE SALVO… #788… CONCLUSIONS of the study: Damage Assessment of the Compromise of Operational Intelligence Broadcast Messages on Board USS PUEBLO (AGER-2)…
A. A major factor in the compromise was the disclosure of U.S. intelligence capability to collect from multiple sources, process and evaluate, and disseminate large volume of information on a near real-time basis to military forces in this field and naval forces afloat in time of war.
B. A second major factor in the compromise was the inclusion of SIGINT reports, and operational intelligence on the same broadcast.
C. Information and intelligence products from the various hierarchical levels (intercept site, intermediate processing site, fleet/theater, national) contained in the GOPI traffic indicated the use made of specific information at the various levels and their degree of interest in specific subject area.
D. The extreme detail of many intelligence reports and the large volumes of technical information transmitted to and from field stations disclosed the level of effort afforded collection of SIGINT.
E. The content of individual messages was in large part perishable or of transitory value; HOWEVER, analysis of all compromised messages would reveal methods of operation, collection, and analysis.
F. Operations summaries originated by SECGRUDETs afloat provided excellent information relating to collection and use of COMINT by forces afloat an contributed to the compromise.
G. The existence, technical capabilities, manning, and areas of coverage of many SIGINT sites and detachments were disclosed through transmissions of technical information, personnel clearance and intelligence reports. A comprehensive analysis of the GOPI traffic would reveal extensive command and control information of the SIGINT community.
H. Because the loss of PUEBLO occurred at a time when enemy ground activity in South Vietnam was at a relatively low-level–prior to the Tet offensive–the intelligence reporting from Southeast Asia contained in the GOPI message traffic was also reduced. Similarly, intelligence on (redacted) activity reported during this period was minimal due to the normal seasonal operational lull which takes place at that time of the year… Final Conclusion redacted in its entirety…
RECOMMENDATIONS…
1. That all members of the intelligence community take immediate steps to review their procedures for the handling of all messages containing SIGINT information. Particular care should be taken in applying the need-to-know principal and limiting addresses.
2. That the OPINTEL broadcast be restricted to purely operational intelligence reports and all technical data be excluded. Further, that subscribers to the OPINTEL broadcast be severely restricted to those units afloat which have a clear requirement for such information. Additionally, consideration should be given to the use of privacy devices of OPINTEL broadcasts. These could include the use of ‘stunt boxes’ designed to print only those messages specifically addressed to the receiving station.
3. That an additional broadcast or point-to-point linked be established to provide technical support to SIGINT collectors. Operational intelligence reports would not be included on these broadcasts.
4. That the USIB advise the Department of State of the compromise of the information that the U.S. government is involved in an active program to intercept and read the communications of Southeast Asian countries (rest redacted)…
5. That on-board message handling procedures be established whereby non-essential traffic is destroyed shortly after receipt rather than being retained for an arbitrary period, such as 30 days.
6. That appropriate service security organization be informed of the personnel listed in Attachment A and their connection with sensitive intelligence. Also, that the agencies notify these personnel that they might become targets for concentrated exploitation.
7. That equipment and material for high risk areas be designed/obtained with such physical characteristics to assist is an example. Al;so, that destruction plans of units liable to enter high-rise areas contain provisions for immediate, ‘in extremis’ actions –such as open fires–in the event time does not permit destruction by normal, procedural methods.
8. That the continued use of the codewords and nicknames in Attachment B be reviewed by the cognizant organization.
ENTIRE STUDY AT…
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB453/docs/doc24.pdf
Humble Host opines ….(1) Pueblo was captured 23 January 1968. The study was promulgated with Top Secret distribution in March 1969… Perhaps that explains why the impact on air ops in North Vietnam from the Pueblo incident never reached the ready rooms and the intelligence briefings of the very folks who need to know life might be a little more risky as a consequence of the Pueblo message compromise… (2) The immediate impact on Rolling Thunder ops was minimal, but as the North Vietnamese air defense guys got the word that everything they said and did with their radios, radar, electronics was being collected, analyzed and used to make our ops a little more effective–and safe. Over time, the enemy would react on the windfall PUEBLO information and reduce, eliminate, of disguise transmissions with the result of a reduced capability on our side to issue warnings. Signal intelligence relies on signals. Cut or change the signals reduces or eliminates that source of intel. The compromised 7-8,000 messages in PUEBLO had some, but not catastrophic impact on Rolling Thunder…
RTR Quote for 2 May: Publilius Syrus, Sententiae, 50 B.C.: He is best secure from the dangers who is on guard even when he seems safe.”…
Lest we forget…. Bear