RIPPLE SALVO… #275… “MARIGOLD” page 254…”Why did the United States bomb Hanoi on December 2, for the first time in more than five months, a day after learning that North Vietnam might finally be ready to enter direct peace contacts? Like so many aspects of Marigold, the answer is mired in controversy and confusion.”… but first…
Good Morning: Day TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE of a thousand remembrances of a war and an air war that divided our country–permanently?
2 DECEMBER 1966… THE HEAD LINES AT HOME from the New York Times on a cloudy Friday with snow flurries on tap…
Page 1: “Kiesinger Named Bonn Chancellor as Socialists divide Bundestag votes 340-109 with Willie Brandt in as Vice Chancellor. Kurt George Kiesinger is head of grand coalition of the Christian-Democrats and the Social-Democrats.” … Page 1: “Jordan and Syria Trading Charges as Amman asserts Syrian saboteurs crossed the line and were to blow up government buildings, bridges, and military telephone lines. In Washington sources said that the United States was planning to furnish the latest acoustic and radar equipment to Israel and her Arab neighbors to help end border raids and infiltration.” … Page 1: “5,000 At Berkeley Boycott Classes: Police are scored as crowd stood in the rain to support a student strike brought on by a police arrest of six non-students who helped organize a sit-in that protested the establishment of a Navy recruiting table in the Student Union. Three students were arrested for interfering with the police (4 column pix of crowd on page 1).”… Page 1: “Four Groups Sue To Bar Aid For Parochial Schools…Civil Liberties Union, Jewish Congress, Parents and Teachers join in move citing State-Church separation. Charge discrimination against public schools in favor of parochial school students.” … Page 3: “De Gaulle Tells Kosygin Of Hope For Greater Ties. Meeting in Paris to establish a new found friendship with the Soviet Union. Seeking a multiplication of scientific, technical and cultural ties. Visit included state dinner at Elysee Palace.” … Page 4: “New Mission For SAC: Vietnam War points up the utilization of heavy bombers in guerrilla action. Pix of B-52 releasing 84 500-pound and 24 750-pound bombs in a test)… USAF fields 40 squadrons of 15 B-52s each and the same numbers for tankers–KC-135s… Also has 80 B-58s with 263 F-111s to start delivering in 1968. SAC ICBM readiness at 1,054 missiles.” … Page 4:”Las Vegas Reports Howard Hughes Ill At Desert Inn… removed from transwcontinental train journey to the Sesert Inn Penthouse where he has an indefinite reservation.”… In the ads: 1967 V-8 Mustang priced at $2,461.46 MSRP…”…
2 DECEMBER 1966… OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… New York Times (3 December reporting 2 December ops) Page 1: “U.S. Planes Strike Hanoi’s Outskirts: Targets 5 Miles From City Hit”…
“Waves of United States fighter-bombers today made their second closest strike to Hanoi as the skies over North Vietnam cleared for the first time in several weeks…15 to 20 Navy jets had bombed a truck area five miles south of the North Vietnamese capital and that 50-60 Air Force planes had attacked a petroleum dump 15 miles north of Hanoi. Air Force F-105 Thunderchiefs defending the F-4 Phantoms that attacked the fuel dump knocked out four radar missile sites and an anti-aircraft gun emplacement with 500 and 750-pound bombs.
“Returning pilots reported many fires and explosions in the two main target areas with black smoke billowing from the racks near the fuel tanks.
“The strikes, intense, but far from being the heaviest of the war came only two days after allied forces announced cease fires from 24-26 December for the Christmas holiday and December 31 to January 2 for the Solar New Year and February 8-12 for the Lunar New Year.
“The spokesman said the raids near Hanoi were consistent with United States policy and that improved weather was responsible for their being carried out today. He indicated the targets might have been hit earlier if pilots had not been thwarted by thunderstorms, mist, fog and low hanging clouds of the north easterly monsson.
“Today’s raid was the closest to Hanoi since June 29 when United States pilots struck petroleum depots at the edge of Hanoi and Haiphong…Hanoi reported one plane downed during today’s raids.
“In the latest raids Navy pilots also attacked another fuel dump 40 miles northeast of Hanoi. Returning pilots reported several explosions and a column of smoke rising to 5,000-feet. Because of bad weather that has prevailed over North Vietnam since early October, United States pilots yesterday flew only 41 strike and reconnaissance missions in the vicinity of Haiphong and in the southern panhandle regions. Four of these strikes were directed in to the demilitarized zone.”
“Vietnam: Air Losses” (Hobson)… Seven fixed wing aircraft were lost in Southeast Asia on 2 December 1966…
(1) CAPTAIN ROBERT RAYMOND GREGORY and 1LT LEROY WILLIAM STUTZ were flying an RF-4C of the 11th TRS and 432nd TRW out of Udorn on a photo reconnaissance mission near Hanoi when hit by ground fire and downed 40 miles southwest of Yen Bai. Both aviators survived and were captured. CAPTAIN GREGORY and 1LT STUTZ were together before internment as POWs in Hanoi. CAPAIN GREGORY was never seen alive again. POW 1LT STUTZ was released from prison in March 1973 and CAPTAIN GREGORY’s remains were returned without explanation to the United States for burial. He was Killed in Action on his 65th combat photography mission over North Vietnam.
(2) LTJG DAVID EDWARD McRAE and ENSIGN DAVID GEORGE REHMANN were flying an F-4B of the VF-154 Black Knights embarked in USS CORAL SEA were shot down on a strike mission near Kep. LTJG McRAE was Killed in Action. ENSIGN REHMANN was able to eject and was subsequently captured by the enemy. He was released from POW status and returned to the Unite States in March 1973.
(3) CAPTAIN MONTE LARUE MOORBERG was flying an F-105D of the 34th TFS and 388th TFW out of Korat on a major strike on the POL facilities at Phuc Yen airfield and was hit as he dove on the target. He was able to fly away for a short distance before crashing 15 miles west of Phuc Yen. CAPTAIN MOORBERG was not seen to eject, no beeper was heard, and he was reported Killed in Action.
(4) CAPTAIN HUBERT KELLY FLESHER and 1LT JAMES ROBERT BERGER were flying an F-4C of the 480th TFS and 366Th TFW out of Danang on a combat air patrol mission in support of a strike mission in the Phuc Yen area. While responding to an active MIG-21 threat to the strike group, they were hit by an SA-2 and the aircraft disintegrated. Both airmen were able to eject and subsequently imprisoned as POWs. Both returned to the United States 18 February 1973.
(5) MAJOR DONALS RAY BURNS and 1LT BRUCE CHALMERS DUCAT were flying an F-4C of the 389th TFS and 366th TFW out of Danang were part of the strike operations against the Phuc Yen POL facilities and were exiting north of Thud ridge when hit by an SA-2. Both aviators ejected, were captured and imprisoned as POWs. MAJOR BURNS survived to be repatriated in March 1973. Unfortunately, 1LT DUCAT perished in prison. His body was returned to the United States in 1977.
(6) and (7) CDR BRUCE AUGUST NYSTROM and ENSIGN PAUL LAURANCE WORRELL were flying A-4Cs of the VA-172 Blue Bolts embarked in the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt on a night armed reconnaissance mission along the coast 50 miles south of Haiphong and disappeared shortly after acknowledging SA-2 warnings and launching. It is not known whether the SAMs downed one or both aircraft, or both aircraft and the two pilots perished evading the missile(s). In either case COMMANDER NYSTROM, Commanding Officer of the VA-172 squadron, and ENSIGN WORRELL were Killed in Action. Their remains were returned to the United States by the North Vietnamese in 1985.
RIPPLE SALVO… #275… FIFTY YEARS AGO THIS DATE OUR PRESIDENT AND HIS MEN BLEW A CHANCE FOR PEACE AND THE VIETNAM WAR WENT ON FOR MORE THAN 7 YEARS AND ANOTHER 50,000– YES, 50,000– BRAVE AMERICANS PERISHED FIGHTING FOR OUR COUNTRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA… JUDGE FOR YOURSELF… THE FOLLOWING IS PULLED FROM JAMES HERSHBERGER’S BOOK: “MARIGOLD: THE LOST CHANCE FOR PEACE.” (PAGES 253-258) I QUOTE, WITH BLOOD BOILING…..
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1966
North Vietnam: “Oh, Shxx!”–Rolling Thunder-52 Hits Hanoi
As darkness fell over eastern and central North America Thursday evening, the sun rose over Southeast Asia on Friday morning. For more than a week, the weather conditions over most of North Vietnam had frustrated U.S. commanders. Impairing visibility, “thunderstorms, mist, fog and low-hanging clouds of the northeasterly monsoon” had interfered with aerial reconnaissance and precluded accurate target location or bomb damage assessment. Day after day–seven in all–pilots belonging to the Seventh Air Force specially selected for experience awoke primed to attack sensitive Rolling Thunder-52 targets in the Hanoi area, only to have their mission scrubbed. Consequently, besides a few isolated forays, the bulk of the strikes that LBJ had authorized on November 10 and 11 remained to be carried out, even after lifting of political constraints imposed during Brown’s visit to Moscow.
But on the morning of December 2, “the clouds lifted” over North Vietnam. From bases in northern Thailand and aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, waves of aAir Force Phantoms and Navy jet fighter-bombers, 194 in all, took off for targets in the Red River delta that included the Ha Gia petroleum storage complex 14 miles north of Hanoi and the Van Dien truck depot 4 or 5 miles south of the city’s center–a distance that the Washington Post helpfully likened the next day to that “between the Washington Monument and the Carter Barron Amphitheater” in Rock Creek Park. Dropping 500- and 750-pound bombs at midday “through holes in cloud cover,” the pilots spotted numerous secondary explosions, fires, and columns of black smoke. Yet early reports confirmed only 9 of the 175 buildings in the truck complex as having been destroyed, leaving unfinished business.
North Vietnam reacted angrily to the “piratical” and “savage” attacks. In state run radio broadcasts and an official protest to the ICC, the authorities said that U.S. aircraft had “bombed and strafed” populated areas in the capital, causing many civilian casualties–Poland’s military attache’ claimed up to 6oo victims, and a diplomatic rumor alleged a third that number– but also suffering a rebuff from anti-aircraft fire from troops and “people of Hanoi.” This “extremely brazen act of aggression,” Hanoi declared, constituted a new escalation. Washington attributed the raids’ timing to improved weather and denied that they represented any policy shift. But the attack on Vien Dien, reporters noted, carried out by fifteen to twenty Navy jets, was the closest to Hanoi since the campaign against petroleum, oil and lubricant facilities opened on June 29–the same day, of course, that D’Orlandi told Lodge of the DRV’s “very specific peace offer” via Lewandowski, in Marigold’s first bloom.
Why did the United States bomb Hanoi on December 2, for the first time in more than five months, a day after learning that North Vietnam might finally be ready to enter direct peace contacts? Like so many aspects of Marigold, the answer is mired in controversy and confusion.
About the timing there is little mystery. After being approved by LBJ with some exclusions and deferrals three weeks earlier, RT-52’s implementation was delayed first by political factors related to Brown’s visit to Moscow and then poor weather over North Vietnam. Regional commanders, authorization already in hand, merely had to wait for the clouds to disperse. The real question, though was, why did not Lodge’s December 1 cable describing the seeming Marigold breakthrough prompt a suspension of the bombing plans, at least in the Hanoi area?
From a technical and operational standpoint, it could have been done; a directive launched from Washington on Thursday afternoon, while Lodge’s December 1 cable was under discussion, could have reached Southeast Asia in time to cancel the Friday morning RT-52 air strikes or limit them to exclude the most sensitive target near Hanoi. “Jesus Christ,” later commented an Air Force planning officer, “if you’d have told us about it, we could have stopped the bombing. If you want to work hard enough, you can stop the bombings in an hour.”
But no such order was sent. None of the handful of top officials cognizant of Lodge’s cable and also informed of the TR-52 target list–not McNamara, Rusk, Read, Bundy, Thompson, Rostow, or LBJ himself–was moved to propose a restraining order against new attacks on Hanoi. Precisely why has been disputed in the most intensive inquest, dependent on leaks rather than secret documents, Stuart Loory and David Kraslow would conclude the December 2 bombing stemmed from “poor organization,” a failure to coordinate diplomatic and military tracks. The journalists largely blamed two factors: first, excessive secrecy (e.g., besides the State Department aides cut out of Marigold traffic, those in the military chain of command–from Southeast Asia to the U.S. Pacific Command in Honolulu to the Pentagon–who knew of the impending raids had no idea of the secret initiative); and second, a ‘lack of vigilance” among those aware of Marigold and RT-52 who had simply “forgot they had approved the target.” Dramatizating this view, Kraslow and Loory’s book, “The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam” (see chapters 15 and 16) reported that a “senior officer in the national security apparatus” in on Marigold was horrified to pickup a copy of the Washington Post as he sat down to breakfast on Saturday morning, December 3, and see, on the upper left corner of the front page, the following headline: “U.S. Bombs Site 5 Miles From Hanoi; Raids Are Closest To Red’s Capital Since Last June.”…
“Oh, my God!” he reportedly exclaimed. “We lost control.”
“I’m sure my reaction was, ‘Oh shxx!'” Katzenbach later recalled. Though he was unsure whether Marigold was the real thing (he had imbibed some of the general State Department distrust of the Poles), the new undersecretary was taken aback. He was far more doubtful than Rusk of the air campaign value–“Having bombed myself (WWII USAF, Italy), I was always a little bit skeptical as to whether every bomb went on target with quite the same precision that gets claimed for it”–he knew of no military consideration that justified hitting such a sensitive target at precisely that moment. Though he saw Thompson and Read on the afternoon of December 1, as they were drafting the first response to Lodge’s cable, he does not believe that the imminent attacks on Hanoi came up.
However, some officials later took umbrage at Kraslow and Loory’s imputation of incompetence or absentmindedness, insisting that they had remained acutely conscious of which targets had been authorized in the Hanoi area (and which were vetoed or deferred) and had deliberately opted not to interfere. Rusk’s executive assistant, Ben Read, stated in a private 1969 interview:
One of the inaccuracies of their book is that we didn’t put the military track and the political track together. From the day that the bombing program against North Vietnam began on a regular day-to-day basis, I had the military representative in the Operations Center of the State department prepare for me on a nightly basis a list of all “Op Ones,” as they were called, which are the intended targets for the next twenty-four hour period. that list came up absolutely regularly, just like clockwork. and when there was a target on it of a nature to raqise questions of possible political impact, and when it wasn’t, we brought it to the attention of the Secretary and Under Secretary; it was just done with regularity and faithfulness. They are in error in the (alleged) fact that these facts weren’t known to the top elements. they were! In the case of the particular bombings of early December which became the subjet of this contentionhere, they too were brought to the attention of the top people.
Read was certain that “the top people” included LBJ himself, “because he was personally reviewing all in-close targets at that period,” and Rusk, whom he “would load…down…with very detailed memoranda of the volatile in-close targets with a discussion pro and con of what the problems might be if they were not struck precisely, as my Air Force friends always try to convince us will happen.” Yet Read never said explicitly whether senior officials reconsidered RT-52 targets near Hanoi on December 1 after Lodge’s cable arrived.
Cooper later squared this circle by terming the December 2 bombing of Hanoi–in contrast to subsequent attacks– “accidental” in that few people aware of both Lodge’s cable and the bombing plans “just didn’t think about” any possible link between them. Deflecting blame, McNamara advanced a similar claim (off the record) to British journalist, Henry Brandon:
There existed field order and blanket authority with some restrictions for certain raids. Those who knew about the negotiations also knew about the field orders., but no one sensed how the action would be interpreted in Hanoi or elsewhere. It became a weapon to beat us with. Lodge, for instance, knew about the field orders, he did (not) say anything.
Rusk denied the Hanoi attacks materially affected Marigold’s fate, but in 1969 he privately conceded vaguely that “one could make the point” that a “lack of coordination” between military and diplomat activities might have existed. Two decades later he asserted unapologetically that Lodge’s news simply did not merit a change in plans. “Personally, I wasn’t surprised by the raids, ” he said,. “We had discussed them at the Tuesday luncheon, I may have failed to report these discussions to my colleagues within the department, leading to some confusion. But the December raids on targets around Hanoi were planned, not accidental. The truth is, we simply doubted the authenticity of Marigold; after six months of talking with the Poles, we hadn’t received any confirmation from the North Vietnamese that they wanted to talk.
From the declassified record, it remains unclear whether anyone in a position to act on the afternoon of December 1 connected Marigold and the previously approved bombing plans–no concrete evidence anyone did so has emerged. Later, some officials defended the Hanoi raids as necessary to keep Marigold secret, arguing that they could not have suddenly eliminated the targets without tipping off the military that hush-hush peace diplomacy was afoot, risking a leak from an angry bombing enthusiast. However, critics countered plausibly, this would hardly have been the first time targets were deleted or deferred for political reasons; the danger of sinking the initiative by provoking an angry North Vietnamese response outweighed the peril that irked commanders might sabotage it, and because Hanoi had not been hit for more than five months, omitting it while continuing to bomb other DRV sites would hardly have attracted notice.
In a deeper sense, it hardly mattered whether officials remembered the planned raid on Hanoi on December 1, or thought it feasible to alter plans without kindling military suspicions. Dismissing Lewandowski’s warning against further bombing as such a delicate juncture, senior figures (certainly Rusk, Rostow and LBJ, but perhaps not McNamara) presumed that inflicting more pain on Hanoi would enhance, not diminish, prospects for negotiations on U.S. terms. In urging LBJ to “lean more heavily on the North” by approving RT-52 a few weeks earlier, Rostow had confidently predicted the “increased burden may add to (Hanoi’s)interest in a negotiated settlement.” LBJ himself had forecast to McNamara (who disagreed) that “limited, very quiet, expanded bombing would give Moscow a little leverage” on Hanoi to enter into talks, because it would do so only if “hurtin.” LBJ (“not feeling very chipper through this period”), Bundy later recalled was
set to step up the bombing program. And my recollection, which I haven’t the files to confirm against, is that the Joint Chiefs came in with a very much stronger list of targets on his request on his return (from Manila), and he approved a very large number of them. And I was very much against some of them and said so to the Secretary of State and so on, and there was a back and forth. The President was by then down at the ranch and had had the operation (on November 16). Eventually a number of targets were removed, but several of them were left on and were authorized. These included the two targets five or six miles outside of Hanoi that caused trouble on December 1. That’s why it’s of significance. The President was in Texas and gave the impression just by way he had acted on this that he–“Get ahead with it! Get ahead with it!” That was very, very strong. “We’ve done all this diplomacy, now, let’s get on with it. Let’s do the job!” (End of quote from “Marigold”)
Your Humble Host makes no apology for the length of this history lesson, which must rank among one of the most painful lessons of our times– more serious that even the tragedy of Benghazi and a Secretary of State who went to bed on the job. In addition, this bit of “Marigold” reveals some details on how the JCS Target lists and the Rolling Thunder target authorization process worked. Note that Secretary Rusk had the details of every daily “OP-One” for his use in reducing civilian casualties by Rolling Thunder bombs. Fifty years ago today an opportunity to start the process to end the Vietnam War was lost by LBJ and his “team.” They fumbled, the war continued to escalate and another 50,000 of America’s mothers would lose a son in a war that could not be “won.”
Lest we forget….. Bear -30-