RIPPLE SALVO… #262… TS MEMO CJCS TO SECDEF…”Military Actions Against North Vietnam” of 8 Nov 1966… but first…
Good Morning: Day TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO of a return to the Vietnam War on the 50th anniversary Of ROLLING THUNDER…
19 NOVEMBER 1966… HOME TOWN HEADLINES from The New York Times… On a clear and cool football Saturday in New York…
Page 1: “U.S. Would Favor a Holiday Truce, But Not a Long One…Rusk stand appears to bar repetition of the lengthy Christmas halt in 1965 as the issue is put to the enemy…Secretary renews his call for signs of de-escalation…Papal plea foreseen…Rusk seemed intent on precluding a repetition of the last year’s experience, when a Christmas truce led to a 37-day suspension of American air strikes against North Vietnam.” … Page 1: “Meatless Friday’s Will End on Dec 2 For U.S. Catholics as Bishops revoke church ban except for Lent Fridays and Ash Wednesday…Pastoral statement calls for renewal of liturgical observance of Advent.” … Page 1: “Jesuit Order Votes Changes called aid to the liberalism of the progressives… Page 1: “G.M. To Cut Back Car Output 8.1% in Next Two Months…Move will effect 11 plants with no estimate given of number of layoffs.” …Page 1: “Italy Bids U.N. Ask Peking if it Will Live Up To Charter and what its true attitude was toward representation in the world organization.” … Page 1: “Koufax, Dodger Pitching Star Retires because of ailing arm and fear of a permanent injury in the elbow…halts career at age 30 and peak of his career.” … Page 1: “Johnson Leaving Hospital today with extended stay in Texas set…doctors very satisfied.” …”Page 3: “Washington Is seeking a Means of Sealing Israel’s Borders to ease tensions between Israel and Jordan.” … Page 10: “U.S. Ships Attack Barges Off North Vietnam…163 destroyed since October 25…shore guns involved…have engaged North Vietnamese cargo barges approximately 100 times during a 20-day period beginning in late October…destroyers had destroyed 155 barges and damaged 141…’United States planes have been attacking coastal shipping since 7 February 1965, but U.S. Navy ships did not begin attacks until October 25.’…”…
Page 32: NYT Editorial… “What Kind of Draft?”…”The clear need to make the military draft more equitable is having a healthy by-product in proposals for a fairer distribution of opportunities and obligations for all American youths. A most ambitious plan along this line has just been put forward by Secretary of Labor Wirtz, who favors registering all eighteen year old boys and girls for two years of education, employment, military service or community service. The program’s aim is to fit the need for a dependable flow of military manpower into the infinitely larger and more encompassing need for a fair and effective method of distributing the opportunity for all young men and women to learn to work, to serve all the nation’s and the world’s needs, and to make sense out of their lives.’ It is perfectly plain that the complexities of the Wirtz proposal are too staggering to make it of real value in deciding what changes in Selective Service Congress ought to enact when the present law expires next year. But it represents a stimulating start toward imaginative thought on what may one day become a Universal Opportunity and Service Act.”…
19 November 1966… OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… NYT: No report on air operations over North Vietnam… “Vietnam: Air Losses” (Hobson) There were no fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 19 November 1966… oohrah…
USS ENTERPRISE WITH CARRIER AIR WING NINE EMBARKED, including the VA-113 STINGERS and Lcdr Bear Taylor deploys from Alameda en route to Yankee Station… oohrah
RIPPLE SALVO… #262… Your Humble Host is pleased to be able to bring RTR readers the entire text of a declassified Top Secret “Memorandum For the Secretary of Defense” from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff titled “Military Actions Against North Vietnam” dated 8 November 1966. This memo was classified Top Secret until November 1984 at which time it was “Declassified”… I obtained a copy coincident with research conducted at the LBJ Presidential Library in Austin a few years ago. This memo and the exchanges between our leaders pursuant to the issue of the Rolling Thunder 52 program for 1967 were discussed in my 10 November RTR post (Ripple Salvo #253, see RTR archives). However, since my references for that post (“Pentagon Papers,’ Gravel edition, and Volume Six of the Secretary of Defense Historical Series) included only a brief mention of this memo, I am backing up a few days to get this pertinent memo where River Rats and Air Pirates can fully appreciate the effort made by JCS and General Wheeler that the case for an expanded RT bombing campaign be made by the CJCS directly to the President.
This memo speaks for itself: the CJCS wanted one more shot to present his case directly to the President. There is no evidence that General Wheeler got his request to personally make the case to the President. The memo made it, but apparently without the requested face time. Here is the CJCS to SecDef memo CM-1906-66 of 8 November 1966… I quote…
“As you know, the Joint Chiefs of staff are convinced that we should increase military pressures on North Vietnam. They believe that military actions designed to reduce still further the capabilities of the North Vietnamese to receive help from out-of-country, to move men and material in-country from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, and to reduce in-country war-supporting facilities and supplies are necessary and feasible — militarily, politically and psychologically. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ROLLING THUNDER 52 (RT-52) program, provided earlier, is a desirable first step in undertaking such military measures against North Vietnam.
“Another useful concurrent action would be the employment of our surface naval vessels against waterborne coastal traffic between 17-30 N and 20-N.
“The salient features of the recommended program are set forth in the following subparagraphs:
“a. Reduction of Restricted Areas. Reduce the restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong to a ten-nautical-mile radius racetrack pattern around Hanoi/Phc Yen airfield; reduce the restricted area around Haiphong to four-nautical-mile radius.
“Comment. Within the Hanoi restricted area are located at least thirty-six (36) major targets of military worth. The location of population agues against striking some of these targets; however, many are located in population free areas. While the number of targets in Haiphong restricted area is much smaller, there are some worthwhile targets not now subject to attack. Additionally, reduction of both the Hanoi and Haiphong restricted areas will permit armed reconnaissance operations against an additional 284 nautical miles of the primary lines of communication around these two cities and the searching out and destruction of the increasing number of dispersed supply installations in these two restricted areas. Area reductions will also provide desirable flexibility, now lacking, in targeting and tactics, thereby degrading air defenses.
“b. SAM Support Facilities. Three (3) SAM support areas are recommended for attack.
“Comment. Since 1 July 1965 the North Vietnamese have launched 949 SA-2 missiles against our strike forces and have destroyed thirty-two (32) aircraft. At least twenty-eight (28) SA-2 missiles were launched in the Hanoi/Haiphong area on 4 November. Obviously, we should destroy concentrations of SAM equipment and SAM support facilities wherever discovered in order to reduce their limiting effect on our strike forces, which is greater than revealed by the number of U.S. aircraft destroyed by missiles.
“c. POL Storage Systems. As of 4 November our intelligence indicates that some 24,800 metric tons of fixed POL storage capacity remains of a pre-strike fixed capacity of 132,000 metric tons. Dispersed storage capacity has grown to 42,500 metric tons. The program recommends strikes on fixed POL facilities at Ha Gia and Can Thon, formerly erroneously identified as being associated with the Phuc Yen and Kep airfields respectively.
“Comment. It is apparent that identified dispersed storage now represents the major portion of the POL storage system now represents the major portion of the POL storage system in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, it would be militarily desirable to destroy all fixed storage in order further to reduce flexibility in receiving, storing, and distributing POL throughout the country. In this connection, while the residual Haiphong POL storage area is not included in RT-52, railroad tank cars have been identified in the Haiphong POL storage area, leading to the belief that the remaining pumping station is still in use and should be destroyed.
“d. War-Supporting Facilities. The program recommends attacks on selected elements of the Thai Nguyen steel plant and the Haiphong cement plant. These two facilities are producing materials to repair damaged lines of communication and, in the case of the steel plant, to build barges and tanks to move POL products.
“Comment. There are other industrial areas which should be brought under attack because they produce or contribute to production of small arms, grenades, ammunition and the like.
“e. Electric Power Systems. Two electric power plants, Haiphong TPP West and Haiphong TPP East, are recommended for attack in RT-52. These two plants represent fifteen per cent of remaining generator capacity in North Vietnam and destruction will reduce efficiency in the entire Haiphong area; specifically, six (6) shipyards and the naval base, the ship and railway shops and, to an undetermined degree, the off-loading of cargo in the Haiphong port will be affected.
“Comment. There are eight (8) major electric power generating plants remaining in North Vietnam. All should be struck, as should the Hanoi transformer station, in order to affect to major degree both military and civilian support to the war effort. In this connection, the North Vietnamese have contracted from Czechoslovakia, and are in the process of installing a number of small packaged generating plants which, apparently, they will employ to supplement or to replace electric power sources in North Vietnam.
“f. Waterway Locks. Four (4) waterway locks are recommended for attack. These locks control water levels on water lines of communications. We have noted an increasing use of inland waterways by the North Vietnamese to supplement or to replace interdicted rail and road lines of communication.
“Comment. These locks are not associated, except indirectly, with agriculture. Flooding resulting from their destruction will be minor and very few people will be at risk. Moreover, the North Vietnamese have expressed on many occasions their apprehension that we will destroy the Red River dikes as a part of out air campaign. The destruction of these four (4) locks should exert desirable psychological pressures on both leaders and population.
g. Ports. Selected areas of Cam Pha port and Haiphong port are recommended for attack. The particular areas, remote from berths and wharves to preclude damage or destruction of foreign shipping, were chosen not only to destroy important facilities but to exert psychological pressure on the North Vietnamese, ship owners and crews by showing that ports are not sacrosanct. It is anticipated that attack of these ports facilities could cause shipping (as in the case of the Soviet tankers) to move out of the port areas into roadsteads and unload by time-consuming use of lighters and barges.
“Comment. If the result hoped for is achieved, not only would the unloading process be impeded but barges and lighters would be open to attack once they left the cargo vessel, thereby giving us the opportunity to destroy imported materials in bulk.
“Mentioned earlier was the military desirability of using our naval surface craft to interdict coastal shipping in the area between 17-30N to 20 N. Pertinent to this comment is the fact that, from 25 October though 2 November, 325 coastal craft were sighted in coastal waters between the DMZ and 17-30 N with 132 craft destroyed and 140 damaged. Since 2 November very little movement of coastal water craft in this area has been noted.
“Comment. It is pertinent that, during the month of October, in the coastal waters lying between 17-30 N and 20 N our aircraft observed over 800 coastal craft. Obviously, surface naval activities in this area would restrict further the flexibility and capacity of North Vietnamese lines of communication.
“I informed you the other day that I have prepared folios of blown-up photographs of the target system in North Vietnam which reveal very clearly the military worth, the location of population, and other factors pertinent to air strikes.
“I recommend the following: (a) that President Johnson be briefed in the immediate future on RT-52 so that his early approval of the program can be obtained; and, (b) that I be present in order to explain the photographs and RT-52 and to respond to any questions the President may have.
/s/ Earle G. Wheeler…. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff…. end quote…Highlighting is mine…
The result of the debate on RT 52: quoted from the Secretaries of Defense Historical Series (Drea) Vol. VI, pages 79-80….
“…The latest policy debate over the air war (and RT-52) pitted the Joint Chiefs and Rostow, who with certain exceptions favored on expanded bombing campaign, against McNamara and Rusk, who agreed to some but not dramatic escalation. Johnson meanwhile postponed any decision until after the 8 November midterm congressional elections. Then, typically, he sought a compromise by approving on 10 November targets selected by McNamara from the JCS recommendations, as well as authorizing strikes against a steel plant (Thai Nguyen), a cement plant (Haiphong), and two thermal power plants (Haiphong TPP West and East), targets not chosen by McNamara but on the Chiefs’ list. McNamara conjectured that the President acted apparently feeling that he had world opinion on his side, but the next morning the secretary convinced Johnson to defer attacking the four specific targets for at least two weeks. Wheeler attributed this the postponement to an effort not to rock the boat during the British Foreign Secretary’s impending visit to Moscow and anticipated clearance to hit the four targets (steel, cement and two TPP) around 25 November after the Foreign Secretary departed the Soviet Union. In any case, cloud cover delayed strikes on most Rolling Thunder 52 targets until December.”
I have provided the details of the debate on Rolling Thunder 52 as indicative of the infamous involvement of “the many,” indecision, delay, and micromanagement of the targeting for Rolling Thunder that is frequently included in the reasons why the air campaign was a failure. Judge for yourself…
Lest we forget… Bear -30-