RIPPLE SALVO… #291…BDA FOR ROLLING THUNDER 1966… but first…
Good Morning: Day TWO HUNDRED NINETY-ONE of fulfilling an obligation to remember those fallen and left behind in ROLLING THUNDER…
18 DECEMBER 1966: HOME TOWN HEADLINES from the New York Times on a Sunday full of clouds and snow…
Page 1: “Enemy Battalions encircled By G.I.s After Hard Fighting” …”Troops of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) surrounded a Vietcong battalion last night 290 miles northeast of Saigon after a day of hard fighting. Troops clearing the area today found bodies of 48 enemy guerrillas. Three Vietcong were captured.” … Page 1: “North Vietnamese Defection Rate in 1966 Reported Above Saigon Rate” …”Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces said to lose more men proportionally than south for first time. Desertion by experienced cadres who have abandoned the enemy war effort more prevalent. However, Intelligence debriefs of deserters determined that no loss of military capability or political structure has occurred.” …Page 6: “Pact To Bar Space Arms Backed in Key U.N. Vote” …”The General Assembly’s Political Committee voted unanimous approval tonight of a treaty barring all non-peaceful activities in space. The treaty would forbid the orbiting of nuclear weapons and the use of the moon or other celestial bodies for military use. Approval by the entire General Assembly is assured.” … Page 3: “Rumania Also Charges U.S. Bombing Hit Thier Embassy in Hanoi. The United States denies the claim.”… Page 9: “Once Secret Peking Speeches Clarify the Struggle”… “Two previously secret speeches by Communist leaders have helped to clarify some of the riddles about the current political power struggle in China. the speeches indicate that opponents of Lin Piao and Chairman Mao Tse-tung attempted to capture control or snuff out the cultural revolution and that they almost succeeded in doing so. The speeches also indicate that Mr. Lin attempted to institute last August an intensified purge of party leaders, but that it has so far failed to succeed. Mr. Lin is now saying that there will be a ‘general organization adjustment in the party and salvation for those who ‘resolutely repent.’ ” … Editorial Pages feature Large photographs of F-105 and MIG-21 comparing a few performance specifics and the following caption: “Air War. The war in the skies over North Vietnam intensified last week. The Russians were reported to have doubled the size of the North Vietnamese air force with 100 new MIG jets, like those shown at the right. The United States sent fighter-bombers like the F-105 Thunderchief shown at the left, to the North amid charges that U.S. bombers had hit non-military targets in Hanoi. American authorities in both Washington and Saigon denied the Communist charges.”…
18 DECEMBER 1966: OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… New York Times devoid of air war in the north mention…”Vietnam: Air Losses” (Hobson) there wer no fixed wing aircraft losses in Southeast Asia on 18 december 1966… USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65), Carrier Air Wing NINE and Attack Squadron 113 first day of ops at Yankee Station… Lcdr J.D. Taylor is first attack pilot off the cats for his first counter… Details on 20 December Ripple Salvo…
RIPPLE SALVO… #291… As 1966 wraps up, a quick assessment of Rolling Thunder results seems in order. Here’s a quickie from a “Report on the War in Vietnam, Commander in Chief Pacific and Commander U.S. MACV”… Rolling Thunder Operations–1966 (pg 23-30)… I quote:
As 1966 opened, North Vietnam’s airspace was free of United States combat air operations. The suspension which began on Christmas 1965 in connection with our peace overtures was continued until 31 January 1966 when, all peace efforts having been spurned by the enemy, limited ROLLING THUNDER strikes and armed reconnaissance operations were resumed… (five pages summarize RT ops for 1966 leading to the following wrapup)…
Effects During 1966: The existence of restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong and along the border of Communist China effectively insulated a large portion of industrial, military supply, and LOC targets from air attack. As a result, strikes were conducted against less significant targets generally consisting of transportation equipment, general military targets and installations of the transportation system. This emphasis against transportation, combined with United States constraint, permitted the enemy to develop alternates and overcome many of his difficulties as they arose. The construction of alternate routes for infiltration; the use of shuttle services, ferries, floating bridges, and by-passes; and the employment of large numbers of road and bridge repair and construction labor crews permitted continued operation of most LOCs to support insurgency in the South. Equipment losses, especially truck losses, were generally compensated for by increased imports from Communist countries.
Authorization to strike POL facilities and distribution systems was obtained in mid-1966. Initial efforts at destroying storage sites were fairly successful but dispersal of these facilities, which was accomplished shortly after the December 1965 bombing pause, made finding the sites much more difficult. By the end of September and despite the heavy emphasis of the campaign, it was estimated that at the normal rate of consumption, North Vietnam retained sufficient reserve of POL to maintain its military and economic activity for up to four months.
By the end of 1966 approximately 9,500 water borne logistic craft, nearly 4,100 trucks and over 2,000 pieces of railroad rolling stock had been either damaged or destroyed as a result of air attacks.
Despite the fact that the enemy was able to compensate for a large portion of the damage suffered by his transportation system and industrial capability, the air offensive accomplished several tasks which, if left undone, would have resulted in an increased ground threat in South Vietnam. The combination of the air offensive against POL facilities and the transportation system increased the pressure to maintain adequate stocks, required increased imports, and added to port congestion in Haiphong. Constant harassment of the LOC’s prevented uninhibited movement of military units to the south and caused them to move primatrily at night, appreciably extending their transit time. Added to the disruption of the North Vietnamese timetable for operations in South Vietnam, these efforts brought about economic deterioration, disrupted normal transportation and logistic networks, and aggravated management problems and manpower shortage.
After a comprehensive review of ROLLING THUNDER operations, which included its objectives, results, and future course of action, CINCPAC concluded that the basic objectives and tasks that had been set forth for ROLLING THUNDER were still valid and that an effective ROLLING THUNDER air campaign, together with continuing successful operations in South Vietnam, offered the greatest prospects for bringing the war to a successful conclusion on terms advantageous to the United States and its allies. end quote…
The CINCPAC pub includes a chart labeled: “North Vietnam Target Element Summary-1966.” Here’s the data in my format for 14 “target categories.” First number is Destroyed, 2nd number is damaged and the third number is total of 1&2:
AAA/AW SITES: 493+479=972
SAM SITES: 18+83= 101
COMMUNICATIONS SITES: 38+57=95
MILITARY AREAS: 118+434=552
POL AREAS: 3,903+578=4,481
STAGING/SUPPLY AREAS: 76+1,065=1,141
BUILDINGS: 4,941+3,363=8,304
LOC’S: 1,359+6,390=7,749
PORTS: 24+98=122
POWER PLANTS: 0+6=6
RAILROAD YARDS: 10+119=129
MOTOR VEHICLES: 2,067+2,017=4,084
RAILROAD VEHICLES: 1,095+1,219=2,314
WATER VEHICLES: 3,690+5,810=2,314= 9,500
TOTAL DESTRUCTION: 17,832 ELEMENTS DESTROYED+21,718 ELEMENTS DAMAGED= GRAND TOTAL TARGETS HIT 39,550….
The CIA looked at these results as part of their assessment of the 1966 ROLLING THUNDER Operations and concluded that RT “had not helped either to reduce the flow of supplies South or to shake the will of the North”… “the evidence available does not suggest that ROLLING THUNDER to date has contributed materially to the achievement of the two primary objectives of air attack–reduction of the flow of supplies to the VC?NVA forces in the south or weakening the will of the North Vietnam to continue the insurgency. ROLLING THUNDER no doubt has lessened the capacity of the transport routes to the South–put a lower “cap” on the force levels which North Vietnam can support in the South–but the “cap” is well above present logistic supply level.” (Pentgon Papers page 137)…
“Wait until next year….”
Lest we forget… Bear -30-