RIPPLE SALVO… #797… SECRETARY OF STATE CLIFFORD: THE PRESIDENT’S DILEMMA WAS WANTING AN HONORABLE EXIT FROM VIETNAM WITHOUT BECOMING THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO LOSE A FOREIGN WAR. It is written that Secretary Clifford was “greatly heartened” in April 1968 when North Vietnam announced they were willing to start talking about how to get the war settled. There was relief because the Johnson Administration was hopelessly out of ideas: the United States had neither an exit plan for the Vietnam war, nor a coordinated plan to win or settle the war. From Edward J. Drea’s “McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam“… “De-escalation had become an end in itself, so there existed no agreed upon negotiating strategy, much less a consensus on which concessions the White House might make to end the conflict.” Humble Host asks: what can President Trump learn from the 1968 experience of President Johnson as American dilemmas in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran and North Korea challenge our nation’s choices and survival?… but first…
GOOD MORNING… Day SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN of a visit in the past–the Vietnam war and the air war secretly called ROLLING THUNDER…
HEAD LINES from THE NEW YORK TIMES on SATURDAY, 11 MAY 1968… Cloudy day, rainy night…
THE WAR: Page 1: “VIETCONG HOLDOUTS IN SAIGON POUNDED”…”Allied jets, helicopters and artillery crews pounded a section of the Saigon slums through the night and early this morning in an effort to drive the enemy from his last remaining stronghold in the city. A paull of smoke hung over a half-mile stretch of Cholon, the Chinese section, and jets struck at suspected enemy positions in the open fields south of the city. Just after dawn, an 82-mm rocket fell into Saigon’s central marketplace, killing a civilian and wounding five….the tenacity of the enemy continues to surprise top military spokesmen, who said five days ago that they thought the fighting around the city would be over in day.It also baffles the American and South Vietnamese ground troops who have the job of ferreting out the enemy….Since the enemy’s current offensive began last Sunday, United States an South Vietnamese troops have reported killing more than 3,000 of the enemy in Saigon and 11 nearby provinces. The military command did not give allied casualties yesterday. But at noon Thursday, American casualties were put at 53 dead and 487 wounded and South Vietnamese casualties at 202 dead and 719 wounded.”…
PEACE TALKS: Page 1: “DELEGATES MEET TO SET PROCEDURES FOR PARIS PARLEY–U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAMESE DEPUTIES AGREE TO START NEGOTIATIONS MONDAY–Progress is Reported– Vance to See Lau of Hanoi Again Today to Discuss Preparatory Matters”… “American and North Vietnamese delegates met in formal conference today, after years of fencing and unofficial contacts, in what could be the start of negotiations toward peace in Vietnam. Today’s session turned out to be only procedural, to consider arrangements for the talks, but at the end the two sides agreed to begin their substantive discussion on Monday morning. There will be another procedural meeting tomorrow. Informed sources said the atmosphere at the first meeting was good. The conversation was businesslike, it was said with no propaganda exercises. One source described the conversational tone as gentlemanly. The No. 2 men on the delegations, Cyrus R. Vance and Colonel He Van Lau, handled today’s session. W. Averell Harriman and Xuan Thuy, the chief negotiators, will head the full delegations Monday…. HANOI FIRM ON BOMBING… Hanoi has taken the position that American bombing must cease throughout North Vietnam–instead of only above the 20th parallel as at present– before negotiating on other matters. President for his part has repeatedly indicated that the United States would not feel justified in halting all bombing in North Vietnam unless Hanoi would not take advantage of the move…In Washington this week there has been some official talk and grave concern expressed, about an increasing infiltration rate since the bombing restriction began 31 March…”…
11 MAY 1968… OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… New York Times (12 May reporting 11 May ops) Page 1: “Over the southern portions of North Vietnam, United States pilots flew 113 missions against roads, military storage areas, trucks, troop concentrations and highway ferries. The northernmost strike was against a highway bridge two miles south of the 19th Parallel the planes encountered heavy antiaircraft and surface-to-air missile defenses. No planes were reported lost.” … “Vietnam: Air Losses” (Chris Hobson) There were no fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 11 May 1968…
SUMMARY OF ROLLING THUNDER LOSSES (KIA/MIA/POW) ON 11 MAY FOR THE FOUR YEARS OF THE OPERATION…
1965… NONE…
1966… CAPTAIN FRANCIS JAMES FENELEY, USAF… (KIA)…
1967… NONE…
1968… NONE…
Humble Host flew #160 as part of a 12 plane go at the defunct Vinh Airfield. Put 8 Mk-82s on or near the chewed up runway… No opposition noted…Wingman Jim Cerniglia could not release or jettison his 8 500-lbers so had to divert to Danang to offload the bombs rather than jettison the centerline MER. At Danang Marines provided quick turn-around and download of C-9’s bombs enabling return to Enterprise before sunset.
RIPPLE SALVO… #797… SECRETARY CLIFFORD ACCEPTED THE HOPELESSNESS OF THE SITUATION HE INHERITED FROM McNAMARA AND WENT TO WORK IN MAY 1968 TO GIVE DIRECTION TO AN AIMLESS VIETNAM POLICY… I quote from Crea…
“In a 7 May speech and later 23 May congressional testimony, Clifford admitted that getting out of Vietnam meant getting out with honor and dignity; what that entailed defied easy definition. In a divided administration what one senior advisor considered honor and dignity might be another’s shorthand for disgrace and defeat. Clifford predicted ‘lengthy, difficult, frustrating, and often stultifying’ negotiations. High hopes for an early settlement were further dampened as the United States with very few bargaining chips, found itself mouse trapped by Hanoi and by Saigon into lengthy dickering over everything from the location of the preliminary talks–finally agreed upon as Paris–to the shape of the conference table.
“In the weeks and months following the President’s 31 March address. Clifford focused on extricating the United States from Vietnam. He explained to the Joint chiefs in late April that the administration’s basic policy was to start negotiations with North Vietnam while gradually turning over an increasing larger share of the war effort to the South Vietnamese. These initiatives were put to the test early in May when the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched their second general offensive of the year.
“Dubbed mini-Tet by the press, the May attacks failed to generate the spectacular headlines of their February namesake and had little impact on the rural pacification effort. The upsurge in fighting, however, left more Americans killed in action during the first half of 1968 than in all of 1967. Heavy fighting in Saigon and in suburbs wreaked enormous destruction and created tens of thousands of and its suburbs wreaked enormous destruction and created tens of thousands of new refugees. While Ambassador Bunker remained optimistic the latest enemy offensive would end in defeat. Clifford felt ‘a real crunch’ was approaching in Vietnam that would force the ‘ultimate policy decision’ on the future of the war. When that time arrived, he wanted to make the strongest case possible to the President for disengagement. On 18 May he assigned Warnke to prepare in utmost secrecy a position paper leading inexorably to the conclusion that the United States had to extricate itself from Vietnam.
“Aided by Colonel Robert Pursley, Clifford’s military assistant, and the secretary’s special assistant, George Elsey, Warnke in a report delivered a few days later concluded that Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition would only lead to higher U.S. and allied casualties and greater economic stress and political and social friction in the United States. The American public would not accept a weekly death toll of 400 to 500 U.S. soldiers and expenditure of $2-billion to $3-billion monthly to underwrite a strategy that Hanoi’s willingness to sustain huge losses rendered irrelevant. Throwing more troops into the struggle and enlarging the ground war would only exacerbate the existing divisions in domestic public opinion, aggravate the already heavy economic burden of the conflict, and make disengagement that much more difficult.
“Although an American military victory was deemed impossible, U.S. forces retained the capacity to deny success to the North Vietnamese. It followed that since neither side could win on the battlefield, both would be willing to accept a compromise settlement. Washington would maintain a security shield for the Saigon government, but at a reduced cost in American blood and treasure by scaling down its participation in the fighting, making clear to the enemy that it could not win, and negotiating an acceptable settlement. This close-hold policy estimate became Clifford’s blueprint to get the United States out of Vietnam. The secretary articulated some telling points at a White House luncheon on 21 May, declaring that the limitations placed on the American military–no invasion of North Vietnam, no raids into cross-border sanctuaries, no mining of NVN’s major ports–left the United States unable to win a stalemate war. With military victory impossible, only negotiations at Paris offered any hope of a settlement.”… … To be continued tomorrow…
RTR quote for 11 May: JOHN F. KENNEDY: “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.”…
Lest we forget… Bear