RIPPLE SALVO… #553… and the NECESSITY FOR MAKING THE AIR WAR MORE EFFECTIVE… but first…
Good Morning: Day FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE of reflections on the air war called Rolling Thunder fought in the skies over North Vietnam fifty years ago…
10 SEPTEMBER 1967… HEAD LINES from The New York Times on a rainy Sunday in the big city…
Page 1: “Soviets Reported Stressing Multiple-Warhead Missiles–Officials in Washington Disagree On Meaning of Such a Program”… “A secret report circulating at the highest levels of the Johnson Administration declares that the Soviet Union is giving top priority to efforts to develop multiple warheads for its big missiles. if the report is correct and the Soviet effort succeeds it means that Moscow could increase several fold its ability to hit a number of targets in the United States simultaneously. One intercontinental ballistic missile with a cluster of warheads could conceivably direct different warheads at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Baltimore and Washington.”…
SUMMER IN AMERICA 1967: Page 40: “Dr. King Studies Atlanta Protest”… “…to decide whether Southern Christian Leadership Conference has the resources to add Atlanta to cities where they have undertaken demonstrations. Atlanta protest to address issues of schools, jobs, housing and police protection.”... Page 41: “Auto Strike adds to Detroit Woes–Teacher Walkout Also Hits areas Reeling Economy”… “City staggering greatly…”…
VIETNAM: Page 3: Soviet Assails U.S. Plan to Build Vietnam Barrier”... ” ‘This is a question of a new and truly desperate attempt by the Pentagon to get out of the blind alley of its adventurous policy in Vietnam.’…”... Page 3: “Amputees In Vietnam–Civilian and Military”... “…provided prosthesis at rate of 500 arms and legs per month with an expected rate of 1,000 per month for the year 1967. A total of 35,000 amputees a result of the war. All prosthesis parts are from the United States.”… AIRMAN DUANE D. HACKING was presented the AIR FORCE CROSS in ceremonies at Scott AFB on September 9 for extraordinary heroism as a helicopter para-rescueman. “… Page 3: “Propaganda Sheet Not Found in Hanoi”... “None dropped on Hanoi and Haiphong have landed here. Also, miniature transmitter radios were parachuted down and others have been cast off at sea to allow to wash ashore.”…
10 SEPTEMBER 1967… OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… New York Times (11 Sept reporting 10 Sept ops)… Page 1: “U.S. NAVY JETS ATTACK 3rd LARGEST PORT IN NORTH VIETNAM–NAVY PLANES BOMB CAMPHA IN FIRST STRIKE AGAINST A KEY PORT’S DOCK AREA–PILOT’S REPORT DAMAGE–4 CRANES ARE HIT AND WHARF SECTION IS CRATERED–TARGET DISPUTE CITED”… “United States warplanes bombed the dock area of a major Vietnamese port yesterday for the first time in the war and inflicted heavy damage…The planes, Navy fighter-bombers based on the aircraft carriers Coral Sea and Oriskany attacked the installations at Campha, the third largest port in North Vietnam.
“Campha is 46 miles east-northeast of Haiphong, North Vietnam’s chief port. The port installations of Haiphong have so far escaped United States bombing attacks. American bombers in the past have avoided major North Vietnamese dock areas although they have raided several hundred yards from the dock area in Haiphong. United States authorities said Haiphong and Hon Gai were the only larger ports than Campha in North Vietnam. They said that about 17-per cent of the supplies arriving in North Vietnam by sea come through Campha.
“Military targets in the Campha area have been attacked, but the port installations have not been a stated target. Ships of several nations call regularly at the port and a Soviet ship was seen there last week…no information on whether any freighters were in the port during the bombing raid. American military planners have been urging attacks on North Vietnamese ports for some time, but such raids have been prohibited by the Johnson Administration.
“A communique issued by General William Westmoreland’s headquarters said the Campha facilities had been heavily damaged. ‘Pilots destroyed one crane and damaged three others. They heavily cratered the wharf area and had direct hits on a coal storage area. Numerous fires sent smoke skyward, hampering further damage assessment.
“The Soviet Union charged recently that two of its seamen had been killed in American raids near Campha.
“In other air war activity: American planes bombed a key railroad bridge 19 miles from Hanoi and battled MIG interceptors. They apparently shot down one of the enemy planes in a dogfight over the North Vietnamese capital. Military spokesman said an American F-105 Thunderchief was credited with the kill. They said two railroad sidings about 28 and 31 miles north of Hanoi were also attacked.”…
“Vietnam: Air Losses” (Chris Hobson) There were two fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 10 September 1967…
(1) MAJOR NORRIS M. OVERLY and CAPTAIN GAYLORD DEAN PETERSEN were flying a B-57B of the 8th TRW and 405th FW out of Phan Rang on a night armed recce and found a tanker on a road eight miles north of Dong Hoi. They were hit by ground fire in their first dive bombing run and were required to eject almost immediately. CAPTAIN PETERSEN was killed in the action, his remains returned to the United States and identified a month later for burial in October 1978. MAJOR OVERLY was captured, interned as a POW, and accepted a controversial early release from captivity in February 1968 to provide useful POW information to national authorities…
(2) An A-4E of the VA-163 Saints embarked in USS Oriskany lost engine power on the catapult and the pilot successfully ejected from the aircraft and was rescued to fly and fight again…
RIPPLE SALVO… #553… Stennis Hearings Summary: VIII of XI: “Necessity for Continuing and Making the Air War More Effective”…
“In our hearings, we found a sharp difference between the civilian authority and the top-level military witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee over how and when our airpower should be employed against North Vietnam. In that difference we believe we also found the roots of the persistent deterioration of public confidence in our airpower, because the plain facts as they unfolded in the testimony demonstrated clearly that civilian authority consistently overruled and unanimously recommendations of military commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a systematic, timely, and hard-hitting integrated air campaign against the vital North Vietnamese targets. Instead, and for policy reasons, we have employed military aviation in a carefully controlled, restricted, and graduated buildup of bombing pressure which discounted the professional judgement of our best military experts and substituted civilian judgement in the details of target selection and the timing of the strikes. We shackled the true potential of airpower and permitted the build-up of what has become the world’s most formidable antiaircraft defenses. This approach had considerable support from those who hoped to accomplish our objectives with minimum force and those who feared that a greater use of airpower risked a confrontation with the USSR or Communist China. It was adopted over contrary recommendations of the military leaders, but true to their traditions, they faithfully supported and implemented the orders of their civilian superiors…
“This strategy has not brought the war to an end. It is true that we have (1) held down the flow of men and materiel infiltrated to the South; (2) raised the morale of the South Vietnamese people; and (3) required North Vietnam to pay a price for their continued aggression. Had we not taken the air action in the North and injected large-scale US ground forces into the battle in the South, the communists would surely have prevailed and freedom would have perished in south Vietnam. We have not lost, but we have not achieved our objectives and war goes on. The price we have exacted from North Vietnam for its continued aggression is one that it is still willing to pay, and the level of interdiction of the southward flow of men and material has permitted enough infiltration to enable the enemy to continue the fight in South.
“It is not our intention to point the finger or to second guess those who determined this policy. But the cold fact is that this policy has not done the job and it has been contrary to best military judgment. What is needed now is the hard decision to do whatever is necessary, take the risks that have to be taken and apply the force that is required to see the job through.
“For reasons which are apparently convincing to him, although not to us, the Secretary of Defense deprecates the impact of a continued and more effective air campaign on Hanoi’s ability and will to support the aggression in the South. The top military leaders of this country are confident that the Port of Haiphong can be a closed, the land lines of communication to China interdicted, and Hanoi’s receipt and distribution by sea and land routes of war-sustaining material greatly reduced by Air Force and Navy aviation, if they are permitted to do so.
“The subcommittee is of the opinion that we cannot, in good conscience, ask our ground forces to continue their fight in South Vietnam unless we are prepared to press the air war in the North in the most effective way possible. This requires closing the Port of Haiphong, isolating it from the rest of the counrty, striking all meaningful targets with a military significance, and increasing the interdiction of the lines of communication from Red China. The Secretary of Defense testified that he does not believe that such a campaign can stem the flow of supplies and goods sufficiently to prevent support of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combat activity in South Vietnam at its present level. The Joint Chiefs and other military experts believe it can accomplish more–much more. It is their judgement that a less restrictive air campaign which interdicts war materiel at the point of entry and major arteries of supply will result in reduced support for aggression in South Vietnam and at the DMZ, curtailed activity by enemy units, and reduced casualties for American and allied ground forces.
“As between these diametrically opposed views, and in view of the unsatisfactory progress of the war, logic and prudence require that the decision be with the unanimous weight of professional military judgement. From the record made before us, this appears to offer the best and , very possibly, only hope for a successful end of the war as quickly as possible.”
Tomorrow: Monday, 11 September: The “Concluding Statement” of the Stennis Hearing Report…
RTR QUOTE for 10 September: CICERO: “Confidence is that feeling by which the mind embarks in great an honorable courses with a sure hope and trust in itself.”…
Lest we forget… Bear