RIPPLE SALVO… #244… AIR WAR: ADD 10 USAF TFS AND ONE CARRIER…Not so fast!… but first…
Good Morning: Day TWO HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR of a non-stop backward pass through the air war in North Vietnam…
1 NOVEMBER 1966… HOMETOWN HEADLINES from the NEW YORK TIMES… A mostly cloudy Tuesday with rain this evening…
Page 1:…”Millions in Seoul Cheer President At Last Asia Stop”…”President Johnson is enjoying in South Korea the biggest welcome of his far east journey. He is gathering the tribute of a grateful people and is gaining hope for the future of South Vietnam. Engulfed in an enormous throng of at least a million people on his arrival last evening and revived by balmy autumn weather after the muggy heat of Southeast Asia, the President has found new energy and purpose here after 16 days o9f jet borne stumping. In President Chung Hee Parks words, Mr. Johnson was being hailed as ‘the foremost political leader of the free world in this century.’ And in President Johnson’s words, it was an awesome as well as inspiring occasion. ‘To an American the free soil of Korea is hallowed ground.’ Mr. Johnson recalled the tragedy and destruction the struck Seoul as it changed hands four times during the Korean War. But the effort was plainly worth it, he said, noting the Korean brave and generous help in South Vietnam.”… Page 1: “India, In U.N., Asks A Halt Of All atom-Arms Output”…”India demanded today that all nuclear nations be obliged to halt the production of atomic arms under a proposed treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Western experts expressed concern that the position taken by V.C. Trivedi in the General Assembly’s Political Committee could obstruct efforts to complete such a treaty. These sources saw little chance that all atomic nations, Communist China included, would agree to a cut-off in arms production.”…
Page 1: “Nixon Bids 2 Parties Meet Johnson On War”…”Richard M. Nixon proposed today that representatives of both political parties meet with President Johnson after this years’ elections to develop a strategy for victory in Vietnam within the next year unless the war in ended before the campaign of 1968 begins, it will become a devastating political issue that will defeat President Johnson and drive the Republican Party to a ‘peace campaign.’…” Page 1: “U.S. Airman Accused Of Ploy To Spy For … “The Federal Bureau and Investigation announced tonight the arrest of a German born staff sergeant in the United States Air Force on charges of conspiring to commit espionage with a Soviet Embassy aide here. The 22-year old sergeant Herbert William Boeckenhaupt was arrested by F.B.I. agents this afternoon at March Air Force Base at Riverdale, California. He is stationed there.”…
Page 1: “Build-up Of Army Tops Budget Plan”…”The Army is under instructions to continue to train new men at its maximum rate to achieve an active duty strength of nearly 1,500,000 men by March 31. This would put the Army’s strength at more than 200,000 above that projected by the Johnson Administration last January. The Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps will continue to grow beyond budgeted levels as well, but at a more modest rate. The build-up will enable the Administration to add 75,000 to 95,000 men to the 330,000 currently in Vietnam by next spring. That is about the level of forces approved, in principle, for deployment to the war zone by that time.”… Page 7: “Air Force Plans New Atomic Arm”…”The Air Force announced today the award of $235.8 million contract to the Boeing Company for the development and production of a nuclear-tipped air to ground missile for use by United States strategic bombers. The missile, know as the SRAM for Short Range Attack Missile, will be mounted on late model B-52 Stratofortress bombers flown by the Strategic Air Command and on the strategic bomber version of the F-111 fighter which is to be placed in service in 1968.”…
1 NOVEMBER 1966… OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER…New York Times (2 Nov reporting 1 Nov ops) Page 17: “In the air raids yesterday, Navy planes from the carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt attacked the missile site five miles north of Haiphong. Pilots reported destroying two missiles and missile launchers as well as a radar van that controls missile flight. The Air Force struck a railroad yard near Hanoi.”…
“Vietnam: Air Losses” (Hobson) One fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 1 November 1966…
(1) LT ALLAN RUSSELL CARPENTER was flying an A-4E of the VA-72 Blue Hawks embarked in USS Franklin D. Roosevelt as lead of a 3-A-4E Iron Hand flight in support of a photo reconnaissance mission to obtain BDA on an active SAM site five miles north of downtown Haiphong at Uong Bi. LT CARPENTER observed a surface-to-air missile launch and immediately attacked the site with a Shrike and a follow-on rocket attack on the radar van. In the recovery from the dual attack on the firing site LT CARPENTER’s Skyhawk was hit by AAA in the aft fuselage resulting in a blazing fuselage fire. LT CARPENTER turned seaward but was forced to eject and landed in the sea three miles east of Haiphong. A valiant effort was made to rescue him but a Vietnamese junk won the race to pull LTCARPENTER out of the water. Two other aircraft and the SAR helicopter took battle damage in the failed effort to bring LT CARPENTER home. It was his 107th strike mission. He had been previously downed on a rocket attack on a target near Thanh Hoa, ejected and rescued by helicopter on 21 August 1966. He was released by the North Vietnamese on 4 March 1973 after six years of POW duty, including “The Cuban Program” of harsh torture of 1967-68. LT CARPENTER retired in the rank of Commander to own and operate an ultra-light aircraft business… Blue skies, finally….
RIPPLE SALVO… #244… THE FORCE LEVELS FOR 1967 …. While the Secretary of Defense and The President were traveling to Southeast Asia on their October trips the JCS and CINCPAC continued months long discussions on the strategy and force levels required to conduct ROLLING THUNDER in 1967. Here’s where the discussions stood in the first week of November 1966, fifty years ago… Quoted from the Gravel Edition of “The Pentagon Papers.” (pages 131-33)”
“The force level arguments had continued during the President’s trip … On October 20, CINCPAC forwarded his revised Force Planning Program containing the results of the October 5-14 Honolulu Planning Conference to the JCS. In effect, it constituted a reclama to the Secretary’s October 14 recommendations… (see earlier October RS)…
“With respect to the air war, CINCPAC stated a requirement for an additional ten tactical fighter squadrons (TFS) and an additional aircraft carrier to support both an intensification of the air war in the north and the additional maneuver battalions in the South. These new squadrons were needed to raise sortie levels in the North above 12,000/month in calendar year 1967. Of these ten TFS, the Air Force indicated that three were not available and the Secretary of Defense had previously deferred deployment of five. Nonetheless, the requirement was reiterated. They were needed to implement the strategic concept of the air mission in SEA that CINCPAC had articulated on September 5 and that was again included again here as justification. Moreover, the objective of attacking the ports and water LOCs was reiterated as well.
“On 4 November 1966, the JCS sent the Secretary these CINCPAC force planning recommendations with their own slight upward revision of the troop figures…In the body of the memo they endorsed the CINCPAC air war recommendations in principle, but indicated that 3 FTS and the carrier would not be available. They supplemented CINCPAC’s rationale with a statement of their own… The two objectives of the air war were to ‘make it as difficult and costly as possible’ for NVN to support the war in the South and to motivate the DRV to ‘cease controlling and directing the insurgency in South Vietnam.’ Their evaluation of the effectiveness of the bombing in achieving these objectives was that:
“Air operations in NVN have disrupted enemy efforts tosupport his forces and have assisted in preventing the successful mounting of any major offensives. The NVN air campaign takes the war home to NVN by complicating the daily life, causing multiple and increasing management and logistic problems, and preventing the enemy from conducting aggression from the comfort of a sanctuary.” (HUMBLE HOST add: Why we were there. “Dear Mom: We are doing a great job of complicating the enemy’s lives.”)
“…on October 6, the Secretary had addressed a memo the Chiefs with an attached set of 28 ‘issue papers’ drafted in Systems Analysis…The Chiefs attempted to rebut all 28 issue papers in one of the attachments to the November 4 memo…and rejected all of the Systems Analysis arguments…Sensing that the thrust of the OSD analysis was to make a case for the barrier at the expense of the bombing. The Chiefs at last came down hard against any diversion of resources to barrier construction. In no uncertain terms they stated:
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that an improved interdiction strategy is needed, but such improvement would not necessarily include barrier operation. As mentioned above and as recommended previously, an effective air campaign against NVN should include closing the ports, destruction of high value military targets, attack of their air defense system and airfields and the other fixed targets on the target list that have not been struck. These improvements have thus far been denied.
“Preliminary information developed by Task Force 728 indicates that the forces and cost of the barrier will be substantial. The concept and equipment for the barrier have not been subjected to a cost analysis study. Its effectiveness is open to serious question and its cost could well exceed the figure of $1.! billion given projected aircraft losses in this issue paper.”
“As already indicated, these issues were all decided upon by the President immediately after the 8 November election. On Novemnber 11 McNamara sent the Chiefs a memo with the authorized levels for the Program selected…CINCPAC proposed increases in sortie levels were rejected and the McNamara recommendation of October 14 for their stabilization was adopted. As a reason for rejecting expansion of the air war, the Secretary simply stated that such would not be possible since no additional tactical fighter squadronsw had been approved. the one upward adjustment of the air wwar for 1967 that was authorized was the increase of b-52 sorties from 600 to 800 in Feruary 1967 as proposed by CINCPAC and the JCS.”
And that is where OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER stood in the first week of November 1966… steaming as before… Your Humble Host considers the forgoing exchange between the President, the Secretary of Defense, CINCPAC and the JCS to be one of the clearest examples of the legendary chasm of disagreement that persisted throughout the war. “And that’s the way it was…”
Lest we forget…. Bear ……… –30– ……….