RIPPLE SALVO… APRIL INTERDICTION…but first…

Good Morning: Day FIFTY-FOUR of an ongoing review of Operation Rolling Thunder…

25 APRIL 1966 (NYT)…. ON THE HOMEFRONT… A rainy Monday morning in New York… Page 1: Chock full of air war over North Vietnam…”2 Advanced MIGs Fight U.S. Planes Raiding the North” … A total of 14 MIG-17s and 2-MIG21s engaged 14 American jets in aerial combat in an area 65 miles north of Hanoi. Air Force F-4Cs downed two MIG-17s as the MIG-21s fled and returned to base. A total of three separate dogfights made the day the most eventful since the start of the air war in February 1965. Dozens of air-to-air missiles were fired in the melee of fighter aircraft. The NYT stated: “This was the first day that Communist aircraft have appeared in strength to challenge the Americans and possibly foreshadows serious aerial combat in the future. This prospect raises the possibility that air bases will be added to the JCS target list.”…The North Vietnam air order of battle includes 60 to 70 MIG 15s and 17s, and an unknown number of MIG-21s…Aerial dogfight article was accompanied by a large picture of CAPTAIN MAX CAMERON, 1LT ROBERT EVANS, CAPTAIN ROBERT BLAKE and 1LT S.W. GEORGE, the two F-4C flight crews who downed two MIG-17s on April 23… Also page 1: “House Panel Challenges McNamara’s Bomber Cuts.” The Secretary desires the last of 80 remaining B-58s eliminated by 1971 in order to use $1.75 billion of B-58 money to fund FB-111 program. The plan is to buy 490 FB-111s to replace 80 B-58s and 345 B-52s… Page 2: “Alternative In Vietnam” proposed by the Senate Democrats led by Robert Kennedy calls for a change in policy that will seek a South Vietnamese compromise with the Viet Cong rather than defeating North Vietnam and the Viet Cong militarily. Kennedy sees the two sides sharing power and responsibility. Saigon, of course, has no interest in this proposal…Page 3: Status of ordnance stocks remains an issue. Headline: “Combat Shortage Denied By Vance.” The Deputy Secretary of Defense appeared on “Issues and Answers” and read a statement provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff : “There have been no shortages in supplies for the troops in Vietnam which have adversely affected combat operations or the health or welfare of our troops.” Also on page 3: An article indicating significant progress in Saigon on the agreement to select an electoral group to define the rules for an election to select a civilian government…

25 APRIL 1966…ROLLING THUNDER … 50 years ago today… Chris Hobson’s report (“Vietnam Air Losses”) on the loss of an RF-4C photo recce aircraft from the 16th TRS at Ton Son Nhut is quoted:

“The RF-4C was the USAF’s photographic reconnaissance version of the Phantom similar to the Marines RF-4B. The 16th TRS was the first RF-4C squadron to deploy to Southeast Asia and arrived at Ton Son Nhut in October 1965. By the end of 1967 there were four RF-4C squadrons in the theater, two at TSN and two at Udorn. In addition to its primary role of photo recon, the RF-4C was also used for weather reconnaissance and as part of a fast FAC team with other Phantoms. The RF-4Cs supplemented and then gradually replaced the older RF-101C Voodoos in the photo reconnaissance role.

“The first RF-4C lost in Southeast Asia was brought down during a night mission over an important road ferry on the Sou Giang River, 20 miles north of Dong Hoi. The aircraft was photographing the intense anti-aircraft defenses when it disappeared from radar screens monitoring the flight. The aircraft was descending after crossing the mountain range and may either have been shot down or flew into the ground. No trace of aircraft or crew has yet been found.”

The aircraft was flown by CAPTAIN WARREN LEROY ANDERSON and 1LT JAMES HALE TUCKER. They were Killed in Action fifty years ago this day. Perished forever but not forgotten.

There were no other American aircraft losses on 25 April 1966.

RIPPLE SALVO… APRIL ARMED RECCE … In April of 1966 a total of 2,081 strike sorties were flown in route packages 2,3, and 4 of the North Vietnam panhandle–200 by the Air Force and the rest by the Navy. The Air Force effort was directed at the rail lines and bridges in route packages 5 and 6 and the LOCs in route package 1. The interdiction campaign in April 1966 is indicative of all interdiction campaigns: the attempt to destroy, delay and disrupt the enemy lines of communication and supply. The mission is ideally suited for the employment of fighter bombers. The mission is titled “armed reconnaissance” when a specific fixed target, like a bridge, road segment, supply depot, or ferry crossings, is not assigned to a flight. John Colvin’s biography of General Vo Nguyen Giap, who commanded the North Vietnamese Army, entitled “Giap: Volcano Under Snow,” includes a one page summary of the US air interdiction campaign in April 1966 that is a good fit at this point in reviewing Rolling Thunder…. (page 203-4)

“US air strikes, such as the bombing of North Vietnam from April to May 1966, were primarily armed reconnaissance against lines of communication (LOC), infiltration routes, dispersed logistic targets, and land and waterway traffic. The interdiction effort in the northeast section of the country was intensified (by the Air Force) while continuing pressure was maintained on LOCs to the south. All railway lines from Hanoi except between Hanoi and Haiphong, were closed to through traffic, although extensive provisions were made to circumvent damage through bypasses, shuttle services, and water traffic. The constant interdiction of rail and road facilities and traffic caused the North Vietnamese to emphasize waterways for moving supplies southward. There was alos high destruction damage to watercraft during the period. Strikes against fixed targets (other than LOC targets) were few, and there was therefore little effect on national capacities.

“Although the flow of men and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam and Laos continued, perhaps at an increased rate, the US air effort below the 20th parallel had some adverse effects. Operations from a dispersed logistical base continued to cause management and control problems for Hanoi. The North Vietnamese, in attempting to circumvent the effects of the air strikes continued to place major emphasis on construction and maintenance of LOCs.  While the capacities of the LOCs still greatly exceeded observed traffic densities, the reduction in LOC capacities achieved by US air strikes lessened North Vietnam’s capability to sustain an overt attack into South Vietnam and Laos. On the other hand, the capability of the PAVN (People’s Army of North Vietnam) to perform the missions of national defense, internal security, and to train and support forces in South Vietnam and Laos was not appreciably impaired.

“The North Vietnamese leadership stepped up its propaganda campaign to bolster morale of their populace. This suggested growing concern on the part of North Vietnam’s leaders over the effects of the air raids on morale, but there was no evidence of any change in regime policies.

“Although the economic impact of air strikes was limited by their restriction to targets of relatively minor economic significance, and by assistance from Communist countries, adverse effects of the bombing were confirmed by Hanoi. Increasing amounts of resources were drawn from agriculture and industry to counter the effects of bomb damage, thereby contributing heavily to constraints on growth in these sectors. Problems resulting from the reallocation of manpower and of inept management continued, with industry experiencing a decline in production. US air strikes on 19 and 23 April halted seaborne exports of coal fro Cam Pha port, North Vietnam’s principal coal export harbor, causing a substantial reduction for April. A prolonged reduction in exports of coal would have a serious effect on North Vietnam’s foreign exchange, 25 per cent of which were derived from sales of coal.

“Some 2,500 vessels and 1,500 vehicles were destroyed or damaged, apart from fixed installations. Direct cumulative losses caused by confirmed bomb damage to economic and military facilities and equipment were estimated at approximately $59 million; measurable indirect losses amounted to about $10.1 million, made up principally of losses of foreign exchange earnings for $6.6 million and losses in 1965 autumn rice crop of $3.5 million.”

Not much to write home about…  and how many memorial services?

Lest we forget….             Bear                        ……………….  –30–  ………………